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I. THESIS
The thesis of this paper is that the recent opinions of the Supreme
Court in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust and Wards Cove Packing
Ca v. Atonio? are consistent with development of the last fifteen years
of antidiscrimination jurisprudence under Title VII of the Civil Rights
* J.D., University of North Carolina (1971); A.B. Davidson College (1968); Special Counsel to
the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. The views and opinions herein expressed are those
of the author, and do not represent those of the United States Department of Justice.
' 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Scalia, JJ.). See
also id. at 2791 (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id at 2797 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy did not participate. Id at 2791.
' 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). See also iL at 2127 (Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting); id at 2136 (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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Act of 1964' and are the logical and necessary result of two independent
decisions made by the Congress and by the Supreme Court in 1975: the
enactment of Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence4 and the deci-
sion in Albemarle Paper Ca v. Moody. This paper shall demonstrate that
these holdings were logically consistent with previous decisions of the
Supreme Court, though not with those of several lower courts; that they
reflect the will of Congress as found in its statutory enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and thus conform Title VII litigation to the
general rules of decision governing all other kinds of civil litigation;6 and
that they effectuate the remedial purpose of Title VII by tending to merge
and simplify the two judicially created "causes of action" - disparate
impact and disparate treatment - and their attendant lore into one un-
complicated claim for relief! This operative effect of Rule 301 is not par-
ticularly controversial as regards disparate treatment cases: it was dis-
cussed in detail by the Supreme Court in an unanimous decision in Texas
Department of Community Affairs u Burdine.' The uncertainty of its logical
and lawful effect in disparate impact cases makes this paper pertinent.
It is a necessary corollary to the thesis of this paper - and a means
perhaps by which the validity of its analysis may be evaluated - that
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1982) [hereinafter Title VII].
4 Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
3 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
" Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct.
2180 (1989); Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2118 ("usual method for allocating persuasion and production
burdens in the federal courts"); id at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Ordinary principles of fairness
require that Title VII actions be tried like 'any lawsuit' "); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.
Ct. 1775, 1792 (1989) (Brennan, J.) ("Conventional rules of civil litigation generally apply to Title
VII cases"); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S, 711, 716, 718 (1983);
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 191 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The notion that this
Court should craft special and narrow rules for reviewing judicial decrees in racial discrimination
suits was soundly rejected in Swann.") Cf Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 15-16 (1971) ("[A] school desegregation case does not differ fundamentally from other cases in-
volving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right."); Colum-
bus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S 449,457 n.6 (1979) (rejecting "suggestion that this Court should
play a special oversight role in reviewing the factual determinations of the lower courts in school
desegregation cases"); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284,
294 n.11 (1976) ("a controlling principle governing the permissible scope of federal judicial power,
a principle not limited to a school desegregation context"); General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Penn-
sylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 399 (1982). Cf 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (1964) (Interpretive Mem. submitted
by Sen. Clark and Sen. Clifford) [hereinafter Case Clark Interpretive Mem.] ("[Tlhe plaintiff, as
in any civil case, would have the burden of proving that discrimination had occurred") But see Ter-
rell, Employment Discrimination: The Defendant's Burden, 29 Loy. L. REV. 287, 303 (1983).
' Cf NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1335-36 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc).
8 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:2
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the decisions made by the Congress and the Supreme Court in 1975 must
necessarily lead to an allocation and order of proof in disparate impact
cases virtually identical to that under Burdine and McDonnell Douglas
Corp v. Green, and that should have resulted - or should result - in a
convergence between disparate impact and disparate treatment.V 0
The "disparate impact" cause of action is the result of the decision
of the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Call The Court's decision
in Griggs can be analyzed in two ways, both derived from the language
in opinions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting Title VII
and both plausibly explaining the language and arguably promoting the
goals of Title VII. Griggs can be viewed as recognizing a claim for relief
based solely on statistics and numbers, to which the employer's showing
of business necessity is an affirmative defense,2 or Griggs can be viewed
' 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (disparate impact should conform to Bur-
dine); cf Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REv. 419, 423 (1982); Ter-
rell, supra note 6, at 305; Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate
Standards, 15 GA. L. REV. 376, 419-22 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Judicial Dualism].
10 In interpreting the law since 1965, the Supreme Court and other federal tribunals have primari-
ly utilized two methods of analysis in determining whether an employment decision was forbidden
by Title VII - disparate treatment and disparate impact. Disparate treatment focuses on the
employer's motivation for the employment decision, and openly seeks to discover whether the deci-
sion was intended to discriminate. It looks to a difference in treatment between individuals of dif-
ferent groups.
Disparate impact, on the other hand, focuses on the effects of the employment decision. It looks
to an identical treatment of individuals of different groups that nevertheless has a very different
impact - and a negative impact - on individuals of a particular group. This different impact is shown
by numbers, by statistical differences between the representation of specific groups within an
employer's workforce. Initially (at least), it entirely disregards whether this imbalance was the result
of any intent to treat members of different groups unequally. Where this imbalance is shown to
exist, the employer is called on to explain the relationship between the employment selection prac-
tice which produced this imbalance and the operation of his business. See B.L. ScHLEI & P GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DiSCRIMINATON LAW 1286-87 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter Schlei & Grossman].
11401 U.S 424 (1971). But see Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases:
Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VmiD. L. REV. 1205, 1211-12 (1981).
" Atonio, 109 S Ct. at 2130-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see infra text accompanying notes 150-81;
Belton, supra note 11, at 1235-36; Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 IowA L.
REv. 843, 849-50 (1981) [hereinafter Allen, Presumptions]; Cox, The Future of the Disparate Impact
Theory of Employment Discrimination After Watson u Fort Worth Bank, 1988 B.Y.U.L. REv. 753, 754-55;
Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems and Origins of the Adverse Impact Definition
of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDus. REL. L.J. 429, 451-53
(1985) [hereinafter Griggs' Folly]; Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate Impact
Liability under Title VII, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 911,921-25 (1979) [hereinafter Comment, Business Necessi-
ty Defense].
Indeed, Professor Belton suggests that the disparate treatment theory of liability based on proof
of intentional discrimination was a "(plrocrustean attempt to distinguish Griggs and at the same
time enunciate a new theory ... since some claims of discrimination now must be analyzed from
the standpoint of intent." Belton, supra note 11, at 1228-31 (emphasis added). See International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S 324, 390-91 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rose, Sub-
jective Employment Practices: Does the Discriminatory Impact Analysis Apply?, 25 SAN DiEGo L. REv.
63, 73-84 (1988). But see Teamsters, 431 U.S at 335 n.15 (Intentional discrimination is the "most
Fall, 19891
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as recognizing an evidentiary order of proof in which statistics establish
a prima facie case - a rebuttable presumption.3 This latter view was for
many years generally rejected in practice by many commentators and
lower courts, to whom it was matter of faith that Griggs created a claim
based on disparate impact separate and independent from any claim of
intentional discrimination.'4 This position was also adopted by the four
federal agencies responsible for the enforcement of Title VII in the
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.5 This was largely
unchallenged for thirteen years.!'
obvious evil that Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII"); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964); id at 291-92 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Cf Atonio, 109
S. Ct. at 2129 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Griggs framework ... proved inapposite for analyzing
an individual employee's claim... that an employer intentionally discriminated on account of race:')
13 The term "prima facie case" was not used in the Griggs opinion. Zuck, Shifting Burdens of
Proof under Disparate Impact Analysis: Conflict and Problems of Characterization, 27 DUQ. L. REv.
535, 539 n.15 (1989).
14 See Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1019-21, 1025 (1st Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1974); Vulcan Society of New York City Fire Department v. Civil Service Com-
mission, 490 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1973); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1015 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert denied, 452 U.S 940 (1980); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 633 F.2d 361, 369-72 (4th
Cir. 1980) (en banc); id at 374 (Butzner, J., concurring); id at 378, 380 (Murnaghan, J., concurring);
Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc., 773 F.2d 561, 571-72 (4th Cir. 1985) ("affirmative defense"); James
v. Stockham Valves & Fitting Co., 559 F.2d 310, 337 (5th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc.,
657 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S 967 (1982); Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S 872 (1980); Kent County Sherrif's Ass'n. v. County of Kent,
826 F.2d 1485, 1492 (6th Cir. 1987); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1321 (7th Cir.
1974); United States v. Town of Cicero, 786 F.2d 331,333 (7th Cir. 1986); Griffin v. Board of Regents,
795 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1986); Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292, 1299 (8th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 844 (1978); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810,815 (8th Cir. 1983);
EEOC V. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1986); cert. denied, 479 U.S. 910 (1986); Contreras
v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1276-80 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1981);
Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475,481 (9th Cir. 1983); Williams v. Colorado Springs,
Colorado, School District, 641 F2d 835, 840-42 (10th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814
F.2d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir. 1987); Nash v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 837 F.2d 1534, 1536-37
(11th Cir. 1988); Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th Cir. 1984); Segar v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1984); id at 1297 (Edwards, J., concurring) ("affirmative defense"),
Cert. Denied sub nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S 1115 (1985). See also Rutherglen, Disparate Impact
Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REv. 1297, 1312 (1987).
15 § 3A of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures provides:
§ 3A. Procedure having adverse impact constitutes discrimination unless justified. The
use of any selection procedure which has an adverse impact on the hiring, promotion,
or other employment or membership opportunities of members of any race, sex, or ethnic
group will be considered to be discriminatory and inconsistent with these guidelines,
unless the procedure has been validated in accordance with these guidelines, or the
provisions of section 6 below are satisfied.
43 Fed. Reg. 38290, 38297 (1978) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (EEOC); 5 C.F.R. § 380.103(c) (OPM);
28 C.F.R. § 50.14 (Department of Justice); and 41 C.F.R. § 60-3 (Department of Labor)) [hereinafter
Uniform Guidelines]. See Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2130 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Uniform
Guidelines). Cf 29 C.F.R. § 1602 (EEOC Record Keeping).
16 See United States v. City of Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218,231-33 (N.D. Ill. 1976). But see NAACP
v. Medical Center Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1334-35 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Title VI case adopting and
describing Title VII burden of proof); Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 991 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc);
4
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This understanding of Griggs and disparate impact was thrown into
utter confusion by Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Watson u Fort
Worth Bank and Trust,17 a confusion intensified to enraged dismay by
Wards Cove Packing Ca u Atonia This analysis explains that these deci-
sions do nothing more than recognize the logical implication of two events
long accepted as properly enunciating governing principles for civil rights
and other civil litigation: the enactment of Rule 301 and the decision
in Albemarle characterizing the showing of disparate impact as a prima
facie case.
In Albemarle, the Court found itself presented with the opportunity
to determine the order and allocation of proof in a disparate impact case.
At the time of the Griggs' decision, there had been no uniform rules of
evidence governing litigation under federal statutes. The allocation and
order of proof, including presumptions and shifting burdens, were sub-
ject to a multitude of ad hoc precedents, each flowing from the peculiarities
of the substantive law. 9 Griggs could be read as suggesting an order of
proof whereby a showing of disparate impact shifted the burden of per-
suasion to the defendant 2 This clearly resembled the uniform allocation
of proof in the Court's language proposed for Rule 301 in 1969.1 However,
the Federal Rules of Evidence, adopted on January 2, 1975, and effec-
tive on July 1, 1975, had provided that presumptions shifted only the
burden of production and articulation, not persuasion?2  Thus, the
Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998, 1002 n.5 (3d Cir. 1984) (Title VII case); cf Kirby v. Colony Furniture
Co., 613 F.2d 696, 703 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) ("The exact nature of this 'burden of proof is unclear.");
Belton, supra note 11, at 1243; Furnish, supra note 9, at 423-25.
17 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988). See Scharf, Litigating Personnel Measurement Policy, 33 J. Voc. BEH.
235, 23743 (1988).
18 109 S. Ct. 2115. See An 18-Year Misunderstanding, The Washington Post, June 9, 1989, at
A26; Coyly The Court Turns 180 Degrees, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1989, at A18; Repealing Title VII,
The Sun (Baltimore), June 12, 1989, at 10-A; Court Rulings Erode Equal Opportunity, USA TODAY,
June 8, 1989, at 10-A. See also The Court's Shift to Right, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1989, at A-I; S.1261,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rea S7513 (daily ed. June 23, 1989); R.H. BORK, THE TEMPTNG
OF AMERICA 109 (1989); Comment, Txas Department of Community Affairs u Burdine" The Procedural
Subversion of Griggs u Duke Power Ca, 17 N. ENG. L. REV. 999, 1018 (1982) [hereinafter Procedural
Subversion].
" Professor Morgan, quoted in testimony with respect to Rule 301, listed five different ways
by which a burden of proof shifted. The approach proposed by Professor Thayer and his own are
at the opposite extremes. J.B. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW, 336
(1898) (reprinted by Augustus M. Kelley, 1969); E.M. MOROAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE, 34-36
(1961).
"0 Belton, supra note 11, at 1258.
"1 Rule 3-03, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161,212-19 (1969) [hereinafter Draft Rules of Evidence]. See text
infra at 117-19.
"Professor Belton provides useful definitions among the burdens of pleading and proof:
The burden of pleading imposes upon a party the obligation to notify his opponent
and the court, in the appropriate manner, of the elements upon which he intends to
rely either to sustain or to defeat liability. The policy behind the pleading burden is
to provide notice to the courts and to the other party of the nature of a claim or defense
upon which evidence will be presented to the court.
Fall, 1989]
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adoption of Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence limited the Court's
options as to allocation of proof: it could characterize the showing of
disparate impact as one of initial "threshold" liability to be met with
an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure,3 or as a prima facie case to be met with a rebuttal under Rule
301. The Court's decision in Albemarle on June 25, 1975, less than a week
before Rule 301 was to go into effect, characterized the disparate impact
case as merely "prima facie" and describing a three stage order of proof
in disparate impact litigation2 4 In choosing the latter alternative, the
Court implicitly recognized that the newly adopted rules would govern
the order of proof in Title VII.
This hypothesis may be verified because, if this analysis is valid, the
Court's choice must necessarily result in an allocation and order of proof
in disparate impact cases substantially the same as that in disparate treat-
ment cases, specifically in the following four critical aspects of disparate
impact litigation:
A. The burden of proof on the defendant at the second stage is a burden
of production and articulation, not of persuasion;
B. The showing of disparate impact by the plaintiff at the first stage
is not limited to disparities in selection rates caused by objective
criteria but may be made using any method by which a procedure,
objective or subjective, is shown to cause a significant statistical
disparity between the workforce and the most relevant labor force
from which it is drawn;
C. The defendant must show in rebuttal at the second stage that the
procedure reasonably advanced any specific non-discriminatory pur-
pose of the employer; and
The burden of producing evidence, or - as it is sometimes called - the burden of go-
ing forward with the evidence, is the obligation imposed upon a party during trial to
present evidence on the element at issue The evidence presented must be of sufficient
substance to permit the fact finder to act upon it. This burden aids the court in deter-
mining whether, if the trial were halted at the conclusion of the party's presentation,
the court would immediately decide the case itself or instead send it to the jury ....
The burden of persuasion refers to the risk of uncertainty about an element's resolu-
tion. When the parties are in dispute over a material element of a case, the party hav-
ing the burden of persuasion on that element will lose if the fact finder's mind is in
equipoise after he has considered all the relevant evidence. The degree of certainty
required to determine whether the burden of persuasion has been met is subject to
different standards; for example, some cases have relied upon the preponderance of the
evidence test, while others have required a showing of clear and convincing evidence.
Belton, supra note 11, at 1216 (citations omitted). See THAYER, supra note 19, at 355-64.
"See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2130-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting); NLRB
v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S 393 (1983).
"See, eg, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S at 446-47 ("Griggs and its progeny have established
a three-part analysis of disparate-impact claims. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination,
a plaintiff must show that the facially neutral employment practice had a significantly discriminatory
impact. If that showing is made, the employer must then demonstrate that "any given requirement
[has] a manifest relationship to the employment in question" in order to avoid a finding of
AKRON LAW REVIEW [V/ol. 23:2
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D. The plaintiff at the third stage must persuade the court that there
was intentional discrimination by the defendant.
Watson and Atonio reflect the current extent to which the Court has
met, or not yet met, these expectations. Nevertheless, the Court's slow
but consistent convergence toward these expected results is evidenced
by the cases in which the Court has from time to time discussed the order
and allocation of proof,25 McDonnell Douglas Albemarle Board of Trustees
of Keene State College v Sweeney,2 New York City Transit Authority v.
Beaze 7 Burdin4 Connecticut u Teals,2 United States Postal Service Board
of Governors v. Aikens29 and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.?0 Interpreted
in light of this thesis, these apparently unsystematized cases reflect a
view of the law more logical and consistent than those working from dif-
ferent understandings have suggested.31
Albemarlds reduction of the emphasis on and significance of statistics
in turn reduced the pressure toward quotas and race- and sex-conscious
employment decisions. This outcome may have prompted the authors of
Albemarle2 and Connecticut u Teal' and undoubtedly influenced the Wat-
son four:
We agree that the inevitable focus on statistics in disparate im-
pact cases could put undue pressure on employers to adopt in-
appropriate prophylactic measures. It is completely unrealistic
to assume that unlawful discrimination is the sole cause of peo-
ple failing to gravitate to jobs and employers in accord with the
laws of chance. See Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,
discrimination. Griggs. supra, at 432, [91 S Ct. at 854]. Even in such a case, however, the plaintiff
may prevail, if he shows that the employer was using the practice as a mere pretest for
discrimination")
" There are relatively few such cases. Furnish, supra note 9, at 420 & n.12.
2 439 U.S 24 (1978).
27 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
28 457 U.S 440 (1982).
29 460 U.S 711 (1983).
30 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.) See also id. at 1795
(White, J., concurring); id at 1796 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id at 1806 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist,
C.J., and Scalia, J., dissenting).
" See Belton, supra note 11, at 1208-09; Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under
Title VII Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
305, 320 (1983); Zuck, supra note 13; Note, Judicial Dualism, supra note 9, at 400-19; Note, Watson
u Fort Worth Bank and Trust A Plurality's Proposal to Alter the Evidentiary Burdens in Title VII
Disparate Impact Cases, 67 N.C.L. REv. 725 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Plurality's Proposal].
"See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Chamber of the Commerce of the United States of America
at 26, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S 405 (1975) (No. 74-389).
"See Brief of Amicus Curiae the AFL-CIO at 9, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S 440 (1982) (No.
80-2147) ("[plrohibiting... discrimination, not mandating racial balance, is the object of disparate
impact analysis"). Cf Chamallas, supra note 31, at 313. The Teal Court's rejection of the "bottom-
line" defense is similarly consistent with the avoidance of any encouragement of quotas. See Shoben,
Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis
under Title VII, 56 Tax. L. REv. 1, 31-32 (1977); Chamallas, supra note 31, at 313.
Fall, 1989]
7
Beard: Title VII, Rule 301, and Atonio
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 990
489... (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). It would be equally unrealistic to suppose that
employers can eliminate, or discover and explain, the myriad
of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in
the composition of their work forces.
* * *
Preferential treatment and the use of quotas by public employers
subject to Title VII can violate the Constitution, see, eg, Wygant
u Jackson Bd& of Education, 476 U.S. 267 ... (1986), and it has
long been recognized that legal rules leaving any class of
employers with "little choice" but to adopt such measures would
be "far from the intent of Title VII" Albemarle Paper Ca, 422
U.S. at 449... (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). Respon-
dent and the United States are thus correct when they argue
that extending disparate impact analysis to subjective employ-
ment practices has the potential to create a Hobson's choice for
employers and thus to lead in practice to perverse results. If
quotas and preferential treatment become the only cost-effective
means of avoiding expensive litigation and potentially
catastrophic liability, such measures will be widely adopted.
The prudent employer will be careful to ensure that its programs
are discussed in euphemistic terms, but will be equally careful
to ensure that the quotas are met. Allowing the evolution of
disparate impact analysis to lead to this result would be con-
trary to Congress' clearly expressed intent, and it should not
be the effect of our decision today."
, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. at 2787-88. Cf Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
109 S. Ct. at 2123 ("As noted above, a contrary ruling on this point would almost inexorably lead
to the use of numerical quotas in the workplace, a result that Congress and this Court have rejected
repeatedly in the past"); Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1803 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Albemarle, 422 U.S
at 444 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Watson, 108 S Ct. at 2788 n.1; Brief of Amicus Curiae
the United States at 23-25, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S Ct. 2777 (1988); Delahunty,
Perspectives on Within-Group Scoring, 33 J. Voc. BEHAv. 463, 468-69 (1988); Griggs' Folly, supra note
12, at 457-63; Maltz, The Expansion of the Role of the Effects Test in Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Analysis, 59 NEB. L. REv. 345, 353-55 & n.43 (1980). But see Holdeman, Watson u Ft Worth
Bank and Trust The Changing Face of Disparate Impact, 66 DENVER L. REV. 179, 189 n.68 (1989)
[hereinafter Holdeman, Changing Face]; Chamallas, supra note 31, at 308; Comment, Business
Necessity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J.
98, 103-06 (1974) [hereinafter No-Alternative Approach].
Professor Belton recognizes that Griggs' emphasis on statistics produces this result but argues
that "[wihile neither the laws that prohibit discrimination nor their legislative histories expressly
provide for preferential treatment of protected class members, this concept is implicit in the enact-
ment of laws prohibiting discrimination and provides greater justification for the [view] proposed
by this Article" Belton, supra note 11, at 1286 (footnote omitted). See also Remarks of Eleanor Holmes
Norton, Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, December 22, 1977, Com-
mission meeting, D.L.R. (BNA) No. 43, at E-1 to E-4 (Mar. 3, 1978) (quoted in Lerner, Employment
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Indeed, the use of a presumption to encourage racial preferences would
be of questionable constitutional validity?5
II. Griggs v. Duke Power Ca
The view of Griggs u Duke Power Cas now championed by the dissents
in Atonio contends that statistical imbalances establish a separate and
independent cause of action under section 703(aX2).'7
The circumstances of Griggs is the classic case of bad facts and bad
holdings below begetting highly ambiguous language on review. During
the years before 1964, Duke Power Company and its unions had main-
tained an intentionally and quite invidiously segregated workforce. Dur-
ing this period, the Company instituted two new employment re-
quirements for most of the better jobs - a high school diploma and general
intelligence tests. These two factors effectively precluded any substan-
tial black advancement during the years immediately following Title VII's
1965 effective date When blacks challenged the process, the district court,
basing its opinion on the Power Company's benevolently paternalistic
attitude toward blacks, found no discriminatory intent?' The Fourth
Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity, and Equality, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 17, 40 n.62, 43 n.75);
Booth & Mackay, Legal Constraints on Employment Testing and Evolving Trends in the Law, 29
EMoRY L.J. 121, 125 & nn. 12, 14 (1980) [hereinafter Booth & Mackay]. Middleton, Michael A.,
Challenging Discriminatory Guesswork: Does Impact Analysis Apply? 42 OKLA. L. REV. 187 (1989);
Jackson, Bush Smiles; but So Far Hasn't Delivered, Newsday, April 16, 1990, at 43.
Similarly, Professor John A. Hartigan and Ms. Alexandra K. Wigdor defend racial preferences
on the grounds of "a skeptical assessment of the liberal values of equality, color-blind law, merit,
and fair competition seen from the perspective of those who were barred from enjoying these things
until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.... [Niow the myth of equality provides a veneer
for further oppression.' FAuiNSS iN EmPLOYMENT TESTNG 38 (J.A. Hartigan & A.K. Wigdor eds. 1989)
[hereinafter FAiRNESS IN TESTING].
S5 "The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions.'
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S 219, 239 (1911).
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
" The statutory basis for a disparate impact claim has been found in the different language
of sections 703(aXl) and 703(aX2), and in the statute's purpose of protecting group rights. Section
703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982), provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S 136, 144-45 (1977); Rigler, Connecticut u Teal The Supreme
Court's Law, Exposition of Disparate Analysis, 59 NOmE DAME L. REv. 313, 325-35 (1984); Welch,
Superficially Neutral Classifications: Extending Disparate Impact Theory to Individuals, 63 N.C.L.
REV. 849, 851-54 (1985). But see Rutherglen, supra note 14, at 1299-1302; Willborn, The Disparate
Impact Model of Discriminatiorn Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 799, 826-28 (1985); Welch,
supra, at 856-60.
"Griggs, 401 U.S at 428. See Griggs' Folly, supra note 12, at 467-71.
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Circuit affirmed this finding39 The court was bound by those findings
under its "two-court" rule" when it received the case for review. When
Griggs was argued, the use of statistics to show discriminatory intent
had not been discussed or approved by the Court41
In Griggs, the court discussed the threshold showing necessary to
establish liability:
Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their
face, even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if
they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices .... What is required by Congress is the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.... The Act proscribes not only overt discrimina-
tion but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory
in operation.... [Glood intent or absence of discriminatory in-
tent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as "built-in headwinds" for minori-
ty groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.... Con-
gress directed the thrust of the [Title VII of the Civil Rights]
Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation42
The Court then discussed the employer's burden of proof:
Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that
any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to
the employment in question '.3 . .If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related
to job performance, the practice is prohibited"
"Griggs, 401 U.S at 428-29. See Griggs' Folly, supra note 12, at 471-77.
"o Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S 188 (1972); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336
U.S 271, 275 (1949) ("A court of law, such as this Court is, rather than a court for correction of er-
rors in fact finding, cannot undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by two courts below in
the absence of a very obvious and exceptional showing of error"); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) "[Flindings
of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.")
4' See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S at 335 n.15; Castaneda v. Par-
tida, 430 U.S 482,494-97 (1978); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S 229,242 (1976); Alexander v. Loui-
siana, 405 U.S. 625, 630-33 (1972). But cf Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881). Under such
an evidentiary rule, the findings below might have been different. See Griggs' Folly, supra note 12,
at 596-97; Furnish, supra note 9, at 442-43; Smith, Employer Defenses in Employment Discrimina-
tion Litigation: A Reassessment of Burdens of Proof and Substantive Standards Following Teras Depart-
ment of Community Affairs u Burdine, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 372 n.3 (1982). A remand because the courts
below had failed to consider this evidentiary test for discriminatory intent would not have conflicted
with the two court rule, but this ground was not available under the questions presented on cer-
tiorari. Petition for Certiorari at 2, Griggs.
4 Griggs, 401 U.S at 430-32.
43 Id. at 432.
" Id. at 431.
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Finally, the Court discussed the nature of the employer's showing:
The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment prac-
tice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.4
Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring
procedures; obviously they are useful. What Congress has for-
bidden is giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force
unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job per-
formance.... What Congress has commanded is that any tests
used must measure the person for the job and not the person
in the abstract."
Griggs did not discuss or even suggest the existence of a third stage. These
passages plausibly can be construed to establish that a separate and in-
dependent claim for relief under Title VII is established by showing a
significant statistical imbalance4 7 This claim is defeated only by a show-
ing of business necessity, arguably an affirmative defense. 8 Events in
1975, however, changed this.
4Id.
" Id. at 436.
" Cox, supra note 12, at 757-59.
"Cf Griggs' Folly, supra note 12, at 477-89. Justice Blackmun, concurring in Watson u Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, articulates this position:
The prima facie case of disparate impact established by a showing of a significant
statistical disparity is notably different [from disparate treatment]. Unlike a claim of
intentional discrimination, which the McDonnell Douglas factors establish only by in-
ference, the disparate impact caused by an employment practice is directly establish-
ed by the numerical disparity. Once an employment practice is shown to have
discriminatory consequences, an employer can escape liability only if it persuades the
court that the selection process producing the disparity has" 'a manifest relationship
to the employment in question' "Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,446 (1982), quoting
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S at 432. The plaintiff in such a case already has
proved that the employment practice has an improper effect; it is up to the employer
to prove that the discriminatory effect is justified.
Watson, 108 S Ct. at 2794.
A disparate-impact claim . . focuses on the effect of the employment practice. See id.
at 336, n.15 (disparate impact claims "involve employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another"). Unless an employment practice producing the disparate effect
is justified by "business necessity," ibid., it violates Title VII, for "good intent or absence
of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms
that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups." Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. at 432.
Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2793.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Atonio, at long last characterizes the employer's showing as an
affirmative defense:
Decisions of this Court and other federal courts repeatedly have recognized that while
the employer's burden in a disparate treatment case is simply one of coming forward
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III. MAJOR PREMISE: RULE 301
Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence describes the operational
effect of presumptions. The term "presumption" is not defined by the rule,
but, as commonly described, "is a rule of law that deals with the assump-
tion - at least temporarily - of a certain factual situation based upon
proof of other usually logically related facts." Absent contradicting
evidence of some degree, the inference by the court is compelled4 9
In March, 1965, Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed an Advisory
Committee to formulate rules of evidence for the federal courts. By order
entered on November 20, 1972, (Justice Douglas dissenting), the Supreme
Court prescribed federal rules of evidence, including rules governing
presumptions, to be effective July 1, 1973P Pursuant to various enabling
acts, Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger transmitted the rules to Congress
on February 5, 1973. Congress promptly enacted Public Law 93-12, defer-
ring the effectiveness of the rules until expressly approved by Congress.
Congress then amended the proposed rules in various aspects and enacted
them into law51 The effective date of the rules was the 180th day after
the date of enactment: July 1, 1975. These rules apply to proceedings
bought after the rules take effect, and under most circumstances to pro-
ceedings pending on July 1, 1975.2
with evidence of legitimate business purpose, its burden in a disparate impact case
is proof of an affirmative defense of business necessity.
In contrast, intent plays no role in the disparate impact inquiry. The question, rather,
is whether an employment practice has a significant, adverse effect on an identifiable
class of workers - regardless of the cause or motive for the practice. The employer may
attempt to contradict the factual basis for this effect; that is, to prevent the employee
from establishing a prima facie case. But when an employer is faced with sufficient
proof of disparate impact, its only recourse is to justify the practice by explaining why
it is necessary to the operation of business. Such a justification is a classic example
of an affirmative defense.
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2130-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Connecticut
v. Teal, 457 U.S at 456-58 (Powell, J., dissenting).
' Belton, supra note 11, at 1222; UNIF. R. EvD. 13; 1 SA. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 3.1, at
125 (6th ed. 1972) [hereinafter JONES ON EVIDENCE]; MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS, supra note 19, at
32; THAYER, supra note 19, at 313 n.1; J.B. WENsTEiN and M.A. BERGER, WEINSrEN'S EVIDENCE §
300[01], at 300-1 (1989) [hereinafter WEINSrEIN]; 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5124, at 586-87 (1977); Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REv.
324, 325 (1952); Hecht & Pinzler, Rebutting Presumptions: Order Out Of Chaos, 58 B.U.L. REv. 527,
528 (1978); Ladd, Presumptions in Civil Actions, 1977 ARm. ST. L.J. 275, 277 (1977).
"o Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 208 (1973)
[hereinafter Proposed Rules]. See also Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315,336 (1971) [hereinafter Rev. Draft Prop. Rules]; Draft
Rules of Evidence, supra note 21, 46 F.R.D. at 212-19.
" Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
2 Albemarle Paper Ca u Moody was decided on June 25, 1975.
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For many years before, debate had taken place over the proper opera-
tional effect of presumptions. The two primary theories were that cham-
pioned by Professors Thayer and Wigmore, and that championed by Pro-
fessors Morgan and McCormick. Professors Thayer and Wigmore argued
that a presumption shifted merely the burden of production or "articula-
tion" of evidence, but not the burden of persuasion.53 Professors Morgan
and McCormick believed that a presumption shifted both the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion. While there were other theories,
eg, Professor Bohlen," most participants in the debate were convinced
that the choice was between Thayer and Morgan 5 Ultimately, the Ad-
visory Committee had recommended that the view of presumptions ad-
vocated by Professor Morgan be accepted over the view of Professor Thayer.
This recommendation was accepted by the Supreme Court.6 The language
of the rule proposed by the Supreme Court gave presumptions virtually
the effect of an affirmative defense 7 This result was consistent with the
dissenter's view of Griggs and of the initial showing in disparate impact.58
The proposed rule read as follows:
In all cases not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or
by these rules a presumption imposes on the party against
whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence
of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.59
The Advisory Committee's note is highly relevant:
Presumptions governed by this rule are given the effect of plac-
ing upon the opposing party the burden of establishing the
nonexistence of the presumed fact, once the party invoking the
presumption establishes the basic facts giving rise to it. The
same considerations of fairness, policy, and probability which
dictate the allocation of the burden of the various elements of
a case as between the prima facie case of a plaintiff and affirm-
5 THAYER, supra note 19, at 336.
" Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA.
L. Rxv. 307 (1920). See MORGAN, BAsic PROBLEMS, supra note 19, at 36; 21 WmGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 49, § 5122, at 565-66.
"WEINSTEIN, supra note 49, at 300[011, at 300-5, (quoting 18 A.L.I. Proceedings 210-13 (1941));
id. 300[02], at 300-7 to 300-9; 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5122, at 566; Gausewitz,
supra note 49, at 331; Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 49, at 530.
" FED. R. EvI. 301 advisory committee's note.
" WEimTEN, supra note 49, 1 300[03], at 300-15.
See text, supra at 107-08, 113-15.
" Proposed Rules, supra note 50, 56 F.R.D. at 208; see also Draft Rules of Evidence, supra note
19, 46 F.R.D. at 212.
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ative defenses also underlie the creation of presumptions. These
considerations are not satisfied by giving a lesser effect to
presumptions~0
The view of presumptions championed by Professors Morgan and
McCormick provided that presumptions were created for reasons of policy;
therefore, a presumption should "permanently alter the burden of per-
suasion. No matter how much contradictory evidence was introduced in-
dicating the nonexistence of the presumed fact, the burden of persuasion
was always on the adverse party"61 This view of presumptions was a
distinct minority among the states, having been adopted clearly only in
Pennsylvania, 2 though it apparently reflected the view of presumptions
in some Federal courts. The Morgan theory nevertheless enjoyed substan-
tial support among the academic communityl
Professor Thayer had advocated the so-called "bursting bubble" theory
in which a presumption vanishes upon the introduction of evidence which
would support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. The
Supreme Court rejected this theory as according presumptions too "slight
and evanescent an effect."65 Edward W. Cleary, Reporter for the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, argued against the bursting
bubble theory on the basis that "presumptions embody the same con-
60 FED. R. EVID. 301 advisory committee's note.
" Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H. R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 138 (1974) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (Statement of Richard H. Keatinge, Chrmn., Cal.
Evid. Law Rev. Comm'n.)
etMORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS, supra note 19, at 36; 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5122,
at 566-567; JONES ON EVIDENCE, supra note 49, § 3.8, at 143. See Doud v. Hines, 269 Pa. 182, 112
A. 528 (1921); Holzheimer v. Lit Bros., 262 Pa. 150, 105 A. 73 (1918). Cf J.H. WIGMORE, 9 EVIDENCE
IN TRImALS AT COMMON LAW § 2493f, at 328 & n.6 (Chadbourne rev., 1981) (quoting Professor Morgan,
18 A.L.I. Proceedings 221-22 (1941) (Proposed Rule 301 was "making a change"))
"Statement of the New York Trial Lawyers Committee on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
submitted by Robert L. Clair, Jr., ("[Rule 301] is nothing more than a summary of existing law as
to the treatment to be given to presumptions by the Federal courts"). Rules of Evidence: Hearings
Before the Special Subcom. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 221 (1973) [hereinafter House Hearings]. See also Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432 (1895) ("California rule"). But see Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 286 (1935) (citing
THAYER & WIGMORE); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161 (1938); 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 49, § 5121, at 543; 1 D.N. LOUISELL & C.B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 69, at 560-61 (1977);
Gausewitz, supra note 49, at 332. See also Louisell, Construing Rule 301: Instructing the Jury on
Presumptions in Civil Actions and Proceedings, 63 VA. L. REV. 281 (1977) (adapted from LOUISELL
& MUELLER).
" 1 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 63, § 65, at 522-23. See Charges on Presumptions and Burdens
of Proof 5 N.C.L. REv. 291 (1927); Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturi-
ty, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 19-20 (1959). See generally E. CLEARY, McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE, Ch. 36 (2d ed. 1972); Bohlen, supra note 54, at 321; Gausewitz, supra note 49; UNEF.
R. EvID. 301, discussed at 9 WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 2493j, at 351.
"Advisory Committee Note Rule 301, quoted in WEInsms, supra note 49, at 301-13. See Morgan
and Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARv. L. REV. 909, 913 (1937). Pro-
fessor Morgan describes the minimum proof needed to rebut a Thayer presumption as being "some
testimony is put in which anybody can disbelieve, which comes from interested witnesses, and which
is of a sort that is usually disbelieved.., evidence which may be disbelieved by the trier of fact."
9 WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 2493j, at 328 (quoting Professor Morgan, 18 A.L.I. Proceedings 221-22.)
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siderations of fairness, policy, and probability that underlie the process
of allocating responsibility for the elements of a case between the plain-
tiff and defendant in the guise of prima facie case and affirmative defense,
and therefore are entitled to greater effect than accorded by the bursting
bubble theory."'
The Supreme Court's proposal met with substantial opposition from
the bench and bar on the grounds that a Morgan presumption shifted
too great a burden of proof, 7 and the proposal was not adopted by Con-
gress. The House of Representatives, on recommendation of its Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, proposed a compromise between the Morgan theory
and Thayer theory s This language was similar to the treatment that
had been accorded presumptions under prior California law.9
The House compromise was in turn also severely criticized. Professor
Cleary stated that the House proposal on Rule 301 "is probably the only
instance in which we would feel that what the House has done has been
to make a rule that is just totally unworkable. The other disagreements
that we have with the House are simply matters of judgment. But this
one is not. I think we can say flatly it just won't do."70 Judge Charles
W Joiner stated merely that "[tihe presumption rule adopted by the House
is not comprehensible' 71 Congressman Dennis stated with respect to the
House Proposal that "presumptions are not evidence, and that, in an ill-
starred effort to reach a middle ground between the so-called 'bursting
bubble' theory, and that originally adopted and submitted by the Court,
[the House through its subcommittee has] in effect said that [presump-
tions were evidence.] This is truly grievous error and ought to be aban-
doned" '72 Richard H. Keatinge, Former Chairman, California Evidence
Law Revision Commission, and John T. Blanchard, of Los Angeles,
House Hearing, supra note 63, at 92.
"WINSTEmI, supra note 49, 1 301[01], at 301-18 to 301-19 & n.2.
The House proposal stated:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or
by these rules a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with the evidence, and even though met with contradicting
evidence, a presumption is sufficient proof of the fact presumed to be weighed by the
trier of the facts.
House Hearings (Supp), supra note 63, at 134. See 10 J. MooRE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
301.01[7], at IR-11 (2d ed. 1988).
" House Hearings (Supp), supra note 63, at 364; 120 Cong. Rec. 2375 (1974). The House com-
promise was supported by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, House Hearings (Supp),
supra note 63, at 130.
" Senate Hearing supra note 61, at 48.
"' Id. at 73.
" Id. at 23 (Statement of Hon. David W. Dennis of Indiana). See also id at 12. A Statement
by the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure and the Advisory Comm. on Rules of
Evid. of the Judicial Conf. of the United States also criticized the California provision. Id at 56-58.
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California, submitted a statement severely criticizing the prior Califor-
nia Rule:
As amended by the House of Representatives, Rule 301 provides,
in substance, that "a presumption does not vanish upon the in-
troduction of contradicting evidence, and does not change the
burden of persuasion;" even when met with contradicting
evidence, a presumption is "merely deemed sufficient evidence
of the fact presumed, to be considered by the jury or other finder
of fact'
However, it seems that in actuality, the fact finder considers
the basic fact and not the presumption itself The House Com-
mittee allows drawing inferences (a conclusion which the fact
finder is permitted, but not required to draw from proof of the
basic fact). Since all courts allow fact finders to draw inferences,
the House Committee has inadvertently endorsed the Wigmore-
Thayer "bursting bubble theory.'
Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Rules of
Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States also opposed
the House Compromise. He stated that:
[the House version of] Rule 301 on presumptions as amended
would be almost impossible for a trial lawyer, on the plaintiffs
or the defendant's side, or the presiding judge, to administer.
It confuses presumptions with evidence; it confuses the burden
of going forward with the limited use that you put in the trial
of a case to presumptions.4
The Advisory Committee also continued to support the version of Rule
301 proposed by the Supreme Court over the House version. 5
During the Senate's consideration of Rule 301, substantial support
for the Thayer-Wigmore "bursting bubble" rule was submitted. As Con-
gressman Dennis stated,
" Id. at 138 (emphasis added in first paragraph); see id at 196-97.
74 Id. at 207 (Testimony of Albert E. Jenner, Jr.)
See eg, Testimony of Albert E. Jenner, Jr., id See also McCoRMICK's HAIBOOK § 345, at 822-26.
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It does not follow, to my mind, that the Court's rule ought to
be reinstated. In my view a presumption simply imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward
with the evidence - and that is all it does. The burden of proof
never shifts. The presumption disappears when countervailing
evidence is introduced. The problem is one of the most com-
plicated in the law of evidence; but I believe this is sound theory,
and that calling it a "bursting bubble" does not make it less so
6
Similarly, George A. Spiegelberg supported the position that "[tihe burden
of establishing [liability] never shifts and remains upon the party who
has the benefit of the presumption until the very end"
77
Keatinge and Blanchard also argued for the Thayer theory: "Professors
Wigmore and Thayer believed that, since presumptions were based on
considerations of probability and practical convenience, once sufficient
evidence was introduced to sustain a finding of the nonexistence of the
presumed fact, the presumption completely disappeared from the case. 
78
Thereafter, Mr. Keatinge supported the bursting bubble theory explicitly:
Adoption of the "bursting bubble theory" will encourage the
use of presumptions.... [Tihe use of presumptions in this man-
ner will still serve to expedite trials.... The minute controver-
ting evidence is introduced the presumption should disappear
and that is in effect what we think the House did, even though
the language used is not clear. That is the reason we brought
this up: the House states it adopted an intermediate view be-
tween the Wigmore and McCormick view. What we did was
adopt the "bursting bubble" - the ultimate result of what they
did is that presumptions do not have any real evidentiary value
providing controverting evidence is introduced. Once controver-
ting evidence is introduced the presumption ceases to have any
value. In our California code we have the specific provision that
presumptions are not evidence and they affect merely the burden
of producing evidence.... [If we have to make a choice it would
definitely be the "bursting bubble theory" because once the con-
troverting evidence is introduced, as a practical matter, you
76 Senate Hearings supra note 61, at 12.
7 Letter to Hon. Win. L. Hungate (July 11, 1973), House Hearings (Supp), supra note 63, at
197.
7, Senate Hearings supra note 61, at 138 (Prepared statement submitted, The Federal Rules
of Evidence: An Overview and Critique).
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know that the jury or the judge is going to look at both sides
of the case anyway, and, as a practical matter, I don't care how
the instruction is given, or how you handle it, both sets of
evidence, both for and against the basic facts, are going to get
weighed by the finder of fact whether a jury or judge. Therefore,
as a practical matter, if you have to make a choice, the "bursting
bubble" is the choice! 9
The Thayer rule had previously been accepted by the American Law In-
stitute and the Model Code of Evidence8
The Senate was apparently convinced by this argument, and declined
to adopt either the House compromise version or the Morgan version of
Rule 301 proposed by the Supreme Court?1 Instead, the Senate version
of Rule 301 provided:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for
by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes
on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with the evidence to rebut or meet the presumption,
but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense
of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial
upon the party on whom it was originally cast 2
"Id at 196-97 (Testimony of Richard A. Keatinge).
," WEINSTEiN, supra note 49, 1 300101], at 300-5. See Colorado Bar Association, House Hearings
(Supp), supra note 63, at 354.
"21 WtIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5122, at 571.
See 120 Cong. Rec. 36925 (1974). The Senate Report stated:
The rule governs presumptions in civil cases generally....
As submitted by the Supreme Court, presumptions governed by this rule were given
the effect of placing upon the opposing party the burden of establishing the non-
existence of the presumed fact, once the party invoking the presumption established
the basic facts giving rise to it.
Instead of imposing a burden of persuasion on the party against whom the presump-
tion is directed, the House adopted a provision which shifted the burden of going for-
ward with the evidence. They further provided that "even though met with contradic-
ting evidence, a presumption is sufficient evidence of the fact presumed, to be considered
by the trier of fact." The effect of the amendment is that presumptions are to be treated
as evidence.
The committee feels the House amendment is ill-advised....
•.. The effect of the rule as adopted by the committee is to make clear that while
evidence of facts giving rise to a presumption shifts the burden of coming forward with
evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, it does not shift the burden of persuasion
on the existence of the presumed facts. The burden or persuasion remains on the party
to whom it is allocated under the rules governing the allocation in the first instance.
The court may instruct the jury that they may infer the existence of the presumed
fact from proof of the basic facts giving rise to the presumption. However, it would be
inappropriate under this rule to instruct the jury that the inference they are to draw
is conclusive.
S REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADIN. NEWS 7051,
7055-56 [hereinafter SENATE REPor].
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Because of the disagreement between House and Senate on Rule 301
and other rules, a conference committee was appointed by both houses.
The conference accepted the Senate language. The Conference Report
describes the effect of this decision:
The House bill provides that a presumption in civil actions and
proceedings shifts to the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to meet or rebut it. Even
though evidence contradicting the presumption is offered, a
presumption is considered sufficient evidence of the presumed
fact to be considered by the jury. The Senate amendment pro-
vides that a presumption shifts to the party against whom it
is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to meet
or rebut the presumption but it does not shift to that party the
burden of persuasion on the existence of the presumed fact.
Under the Senate amendment, a presumption is sufficient
to get a party past an adverse party's motion to dismiss made
at the end of his case-in-chief. If the adverse party offers no
evidence contradicting the presumed fact, the court will instruct
the jury that if it finds the basic facts, it may presume the ex-
istence of the presumed fact. If the adverse party does offer
evidence contradicting the presumed fact, the court cannot in-
struct the jury that it may presume the existence of the pre-
sumed fact from proof of the basic facts. The court may, however,
instruct the jury that it may infer the existence of the presumed
fact from proof of the basic facts?3
While initially there may have been some reason for confusion s4
Justice Powell in Burdine left no cause for doubt that Congress in amend-
ing proposed Rule 301, fully accepted the view of presumptions as
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1597, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 7098, 7099 [hereinafter CoNF. Comm. REPoRT].
" 1 LounsELL & MUELLER, supra note 63, § 70, at 566-67, disagrees with the Thayer theory and
proposes variations from this position plausibly "consistent with Rule 301 on its face,' though ad-
mitting that the rule can be read to adopt the Thayer view. See also id § 67, at 532-34. Wright
and Graham seem to proceed on the assumption that Congress sought a theory intermediate be-
tween the Morgan and Thayer theories. 21 WRIGr & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5121, at 546-47;
§ 5122, at 571; § 5126, at 606,614. See Allen, Presumptions Inferences and Burden of Proof in Federal
Civil Actions - An Anatomy of Unnecessary Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform, 76 Nw. U.L. REV.
892, 893 (1982) [hereinafter Allen, Anatomy] ("[T~he ambiguity is primarily attributable to loose
language in the commentary to the Rule rather than to the wording of the Rule itself"); Broun,
The Unfufillable Promise of One Rule for All Presumptions, 62 N.C.L. REv. 697, 704 (1984) (arguments
for stronger reading of Rule 301 have merit). Cf Procedural Subversion, supra note 18, at 1009 n.57.
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articulated by Thayer in 1898, the "bursting bubble" view of presump-
tions. 5
Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, both as proposed and as
adopted, governs all presumptions in civil litigation under federal statutes.
The language of all of the draft versions of Rule 301 reflects that the rule
was intended generally to govern presumptions8 Only presumptions
created specifically by Act of Congress and whose terms conflict with the
provisions of the rule were excepted?7 There was no intent to repeal or
amend any such provisions. As to all other presumptions, including
presumptions created by common law or judicial construction and accorded
greater weight by those sources, Rule 301 would govern.8 In the debates
over Rule 301, and with respect to the Federal Rules of Evidence in
general, there is no suggestion that these rules would not apply to Title
VII, or would apply only to disparate treatment cases. There is also no
suggestion in the legislative history of the rules of evidence that Title
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S at 255 n.10 ("See generally J. THAYER,
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 314 (1898)') See JoNEs ON EVIDENCE, supra note 49, § 3.8 at
28 (1988 Supp.); 10 MooRE's, supra note 68, 301.011], at IH-6 ("unsullied Thayer theory"); WEN-
STEmN, supra note 49, 1 300[03], at 300-16; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 2493h, at 340; Hecht & Pinzler,
supra note 49, at 530,554; Allen, Anatomy, supra note 84, at 893; Zuck, supra note 13, at 543. Pro-
fessor Edward W. Cleary, Reporter for the Advisory Committee, stated "the proposed Senate bill
adopts a straight bursting bubble rule." Memorandum of Oct. 31, 1974 quoted in WENSTEIN, supra
note 49, 1 301[01], at 301-10.
" 1 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 63, § 68, at 540; Ladd, supra note 49, at 283. Cf Gausewitz,
supra note 49, at 331-32.
Wright & Graham contend, possibly persuasively, that certain rules allocating burdens of per-
suasion, though called "presumptions" are not true presumptions for the purposes of Rule 301 because
these allocations are not dependent on the establishment of a basic fact. See definition of presump-
tion at text accompanying note 49, supra. Examples of this form of "presumption:' which they label
"assumptions" are the "assumption" of innocence in criminal cases. This exception is not relevant
to Title VII litigation because the presumption in a prima facie case is dependent on the establish-
ment of basic facts of disparate impact or disparate treatment. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
49, § 5129, at 589-91.
They further discuss other instances where courts have spoken of presumptions, but which are
purportedly unrelated to the burden of proof or establishment of facts. Id at 591-92. This is also
beyond the scope of this paper.
11 10 MooRE's, supra note 68, 301.02, at 11-14 ("If the statute does not declare the effect [of
a presumption] then the Thayer effect stated in Rule 301 would govern") Where a statutory presump-
tion had been judicially construed to shift a burden of persuasion, Rule 301 prevails and alters this
previous interpretation. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5123, at 583.
Proposed Rules, supra note 50, 56 F.R.D. at 208 (advisory committee's note); Rev. Draft Prop.
Rules, supra note 50, 51 F.R.D. at 336 ("This rule governs presumptions generally."); W.INSTENm,
supra note 49, 300[03], at 300-12. See Draft Rules of Evidence, supra note 21, 46 F.R.D. at 214;
10 MooRE's, supra note 68, 1 301.03[2], at rn1-18; 21 WIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5122, at
570. But see 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5123, at 577 ("presumptions in a civil nonjury
trial under Rule 301 are little more than rhetorical devices[;]... they have no mandatory effect");
id. § 5123, at 578 ("presumptions created to enforce constitutional rights are probably beyond the
power of Congress to alter.") Rule 302 governed civil litigation under state laws.
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VII itself provided for a different treatment of presumptions. 9 Indeed,
the language of the rule was modified twice to assure that it would app-
ly to all civil proceedings, and apply to no criminal matters. There is no
suggestion that Congress intended to reverse the Court's preference for
a uniform treatment for presumptions, except where "otherwise provid-
ed by Act of Congress.""e
Professor Morgan would not have supported this uniform treatment
of all presumptions, but instead believed that all presumptions should
not be treated similarly?1 Rather, he urged that presumptions rested on
different theories as to their respective purpose, and, depending upon the
purpose on which the presumption being dealt with rested, the opera-
tional effect of the presumption should vary from the "bursting bubble"
theory (Thayer) to a total shifting of the burden of persuasion?2 Though
many states followed two or more rules concerning presumptions, listing
presumptions of each sort," the Supreme Court declined to have two types
of presumptions and opted for uniformity. A number of legal scholars also
supported this decision? On the other hand, the Thayer position adopted
by Congress was intended to describe the operational effect of all presump-
tions 5
" But see United States v. City of Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218, 231-33 (N.D. 111. 1976). Both the
NAACP and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission commented on the proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence. Neither chose to comment on Rule 301. Letter from Jack Greenberg, Director-
Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., to Hon. William L. Hungate, Chair-
man (Mar. 5, 1973), House Hearings supra note 63, at 514-15; Letter from William A. Carey, General
Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to the Hon. William L. Hungate (Aug. 7,
1973), House Hearings (Supp), supra note 63, at 311.
" See Subcomm. Note, Subcomm. on Crim. J., House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (Comm. Print 1973), reprinted in House Hearings (Supp), supra note 63, at 152; Comments
by Richard H. Field, on the Subcomm. Draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence, submitted by Hon.
William S Cohen by letter to Hon. William L. Hungate (July 31, 1973), House Hearings (Supp),
supra note 63, at 268-73.
91 Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARv. L. REv. 906 (1931).
"9 WiGMORE, supra note 62, § 2493f, at 326 & n.4. See Position Paper on Proposed Federal Rule
of Evidence No. 301, submitted for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by the Committee
of Federal Evidence and Procedure, Article I, Presumptions. House Hearings (Supp), supra note
63, at 130-34. See alsq eg, O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 60, 170 A. 486, 487 (1934); WEmnSrEn4,
supra note 49, 1 300[02], at 300-8. But see Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at
Evidence, 50 HARv. L. REV. 909, 912-13 (1937) (Morgan supported uniform treatment of presump-
tions); Belton, supra note 11, at 1267-68.
"E.g, California Evidence Code, § 63045, 660-68; WEiNSrEni, supra note 49, 300[02, at 300-8;
Unif. R. Evid. 14.
SWmNsTEiN, supra note 49, 300[02], at 300-8 to 300-9.
*3 9 WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 2493f, at 328 (quoting 18 A.L.I. Proceedings at 226). Cf THAYER,
supra note 19, at 313-52.
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The enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, including rules gover-
ning presumptions, was well within the authority of Congress?' The
plenary authority of Congress over Rules of Evidence, in both their pro-
cedural and substantive aspects, was supported by a number of submis-
sions in the consideration of the Federal Rules of Evidence. As Ronan
E. Degnan, Professor of Law at the University of California Law School,
Berkeley, stated:
[tihe power of Congress over evidence law is not fettered by the
distinction between substance and procedure; that given to the
Court is. Some rules often grouped under the general name of
evidence may affect substantive rights in a manner prohibited
by the restricting clauses of the enabling acts [allowing the
Supreme Court to adopt procedural rules]. Presumptions and
burden of proof are probably within the prohibition, even in
federal question cases?
The Supreme Court accepted this view not only by acquiescing in the
adoption of the Rules as modified, but also by its holding in Usery u Turner
Elkhorn Mining Ca ,9' a case concerning presumptions and in which Rule
301 was cited. There the Court noted that "Congress ... has plenary
authority over the promulgation of evidentiary rules for the federal
courts"'9 9
IV. MINOR PREMISE: THE THREE STAGE ORDER OF PROOF
In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green°00 the Supreme Court
outlined a three-part order of proof.
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial
burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of
racial discrimination .... The burden then must shift to the
employer to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory
"But see Senate Hearings supra note 61, at 58 (Statement of Stand. Comm. on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure and the Advisory Comm. on Rules of Evidence of the Judicial Conf. of the United
States).
11 Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARv. L. REV. 275, 283 (1962). See House
Hearings; supra note 63, at 306 (Statement of James F. Schaeffer); id at 495, 510 (Statement by
Stuart H. Johnson, Jr.); Position Paper on Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence No. 301, submitted
for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by the Committee of Evidence and Procedure, Arti-
cle III, Presumptions, House Hearings (Supp), supra note 63, at 130-34.
*' 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
428 U.S. at 31. See also Lavine v. Milne, 424 US. 577, 585 (1976) ("Outside the criminal law
area,... the locus of the burden of persuasion is normally not an issue of federal constitutional
moment"); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1958); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463,
467-69 (1943). Cf Proposed Rules, supra note 50, 56 F.R.D. at 185 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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reason for the employee's rejection.... [Tihe inquiry must not
end here... [Riespondent must,.. . be afforded a fair oppor-
tunity to show that petitioner's stated reason for respondent's
rejection was in fact pretext [for the sort of discrimination pro-
hibited by section 703(aX)1.' 0
While this opinion concerned initially only "the order and allocation
of proof in a private, non-class action challenging employment discrimina-
tion" 102 it is the seminal treatment of the burdens allocation question,0
and was subsequently utilized in International Brotherhood of Teamsters
u United States'04 for class actions.0 5
In Albemarle, the Supreme Court construed the claim for relief under
Griggs to require the same three stage allocation and order of proof set
forth in McDonnell Douglas:106
In Griggs v. Duke Power Company... this Court unanimous-
ly held that Title VII forbids the use of employment tests that
are discriminatory in effect unless the employer meets "the
burden of showing that any given requirement [has]... a
manifest relationship to the employment in question." Id. at
432. [Footnote omitted] This burden arises, of course, only after
the complaining party or class has made out a prima facie case
of discrimination, Le, has shown that the tests in question select
applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significant-
ly different from that of the pool of applicants. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 817, 36
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). If an employer does then meet the burden
of proving that its tests are "job related," it remains open to
the complaining party to show that other test or selection
devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also
serve the employer's legitimate interest in "efficient and
trustworthy workmanship.' [McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.] at
801, 93 S.Ct. [at 1823]. Such a showing would be evidence that
the employer was using its test merely as a "pretext" for
101 Id. at 802-04.
1
" Id. at 800. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S at 252-53; United States
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S at 713 n.1.
10 Belton, supra note 11, at 1235.
104 431 U.S. 324, 336, 357-58 (1977). But compare Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at
1799 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (dicta suggesting that the employer's burden with respect to un-
named individual members of a successful class is one of persuasion) with Cooper v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 467 U.S 867, 875 (1984) (stating that "existence of a discriminatory pattern or practice
established a presumption that [unnamed] individual class members had been discriminated against"
(citing Burdine) (emphasis added.))
1I But see ScrLsi & GRossMAN, supra note 10, at 1288-89.
106 411 U.S 792.
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discrimination. [McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.] at 804-805, 93
S.Ct. [at 1825-1826]. In the present case, however, we are con-
cerned only with the question whether Albemarle has shown
its test to be job related.
The concept of job relatedness takes on meaning from the
facts of the Griggs case.0 07
The Court acknowledged that this order of proof was newly applied to
disparate impact cases.
The appropriate standard of proof for job relatedness has not
been clarified until today. Similarly, the respondents have not
until today been specifically apprised of their opportunity to
present evidence that even validated tests might be a "pretext"
for discrimination in light of alternative selection procedures
available to the Company.0 8
The application of the McDonnell Douglas allocation and order of proof
was not disavowed in any of the concurring and dissenting opinions.09
1
o
7 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 425-26. In characterizing the nature of the rebut-
tal evidence as merely "job related" the Court substantially broadened the Fourth Circuit's far more
restrictive characterization. See Albemarle, 474 F.2d 134, 138 n.2, (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S 1006 (1971.))
100 Albemarle, 422 U.S at 436. The three stage order of proof was not suggested in any of the
briefs filed by the parties, nor by the amici. Only the defendants even characterize the disparate
impact showing as a prima facie case, Brief of Petitioners at 28 ("In any Title VII case, plaintiff
bears the burden of showing prima facie discrimination. McDonnell Douglas"), id. at 47 n.45 ("Ti-
tle VII imposes a heavy burden on defendants after a prima facie effect on minorities is shown.");
Petition for Certiorari at 14 ("it does not follow that Petitioner cannot ultimately rebut the prima
facie case of discrimination by properly validating the tests. Compare McDonnell Douglas.") See
Brief of Amici Curiae the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at
36 (disparate impact is a "threshold showing"); Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Society for
Personnel Administration; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Scott Paper Co Similar to Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Watson, the Court sua sponte provided detailed guidance as to the order and allocation of proof,
which guidance was not necessary to the determination of the questions presented on certiorari.
100 Albemarle, 422 U.S at 440-49. Justice Blackmun appears to have forgotten the genesis of
the order and allocation of proof in a disparate impact case. In Watson u Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
he states:
The plurality's suggested allocation of burdens bears a closer resemblance to the alloca-
tion of burdens we established for disparate-treatment claims in McDonnell Douglas
Corp u Green (1973), and Texas Dept of Community Affairs u Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
252-256, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093-1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), than it does to those the
Court has established for disparate-impact claims.
Watson, 108 S Ct. at 2792. See also id. ("near-perfect echo" "mimid'), id. at 2794, ("echo"). As discussed
in the text, the allocation of proof in disparate impact cases resembles that established in McDon-
nell Douglas because the order of proof was explicitly modeled after McDonnell Douglas;, Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("ITlhe line between discriminatory purpose and
discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not as critical, as the reader of the Court's
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There was no mention of Rule 301, which would become effective six
days later. Nevertheless, this order of proof was entirely consistent with
the newly enacted rule, just as Griggs itself had been consistent with
the rule proposed in 1969.
In subsequent decisions, the Court similarly described the three stage
allocation and order of proof in disparate impact cases.!1"
As Title VII law has developed since Albemarle, the Court has
retreated from any holding that Title VII allows a separate claim for group
rights and racial proportionality under the guise of "disparate impact""'
The Court has been very reluctant, however, to repudiate explicitly the
construction of Griggs,"2 heretofore accorded it by so many of the lower
federal courts and thus to slaughter one of the sacred cows of civil rights.
Atonic4 however, produced the bovine corpse and proceeded to examine
its entrails.
opinion might assume."); NAACP v. Medical Center Ina, 657 F.2d 1322, 1335 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc);
Cf Furnish, supra note 9, at 421-22; Lamber, Alternatives to Challenged Employee Selection Criteria:
The Significance of Nonstatistical Evidence in Disparate Impact Cases Under Title VII, 1985 Wisc.
L. REv. 1, 9 (1985); Reynard, Proving Title VII Sex-Based Wage Discrimination after County of
Washington u Gunther, 4 CAmozo L. REv. 281, 308 n.132 (1983). Contra, Belton, supra note 11, at
1244 (Albemarle only "seemed" to adopt McDonnell Douglas approach).
110 Teal, 457 U.S at 446-47. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S at 329 (three stage order of proof
beginning with "prima facie case of discrimination"); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. at 584 ("prima facie violation"); id. at 587 ("prima facie case of discrimination" beginning a
three stage order of proof). See also Wards Cove Packing Ca v. Atonio, 109 S, Ct. at 2131, 2135 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("prima facie case,' "prima facie case of discrimination").
" In Teal, the Court made clear that "the principal focus [of Title VII] is the protection of the
individual employee, rather than the protection of the minority group as a whole." 457 U.S at 453-54.
This followed the Court's position in City of Los Angeles Dep't. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702,709 (1978) where the Court held that "the basic policy of [Title VIII requires that we focus
on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes:' See also Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978). Tears emphasis on individual rights effectively undermined the
operational purpose for the distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact. Blumrosen,
The Group Interest Concept; Employment Discrimination, and Legislative Intent The Fallacy of Con-
necticut u Teal, 20 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 99, 109 (1983) (disapproves); Delahunty, supra note 33, at 469-7 1;
McConnell, Affirmative Action After Teak A New Twist or a Turn of the Screw? 7 REG., Man-Apr.
1983, at 38; Welch, supra, note 37, at 868 n.100. Cf Chamallas, supra note 31, at 314; Lamber,
supra note 109, at 40.
" See Belton, supra note 11, at 1209 ("the burden of proof issue may well be the battleground
upon which some judges are attempting to repudiate the disparate impact theory of discrimina-
tion?') On the other hand, Professor Belton notes that "[t]he courts have recognized that the line
between discriminatory intent and discriminatory impact is not as distinct as it appears to be at
first glance." Id. at 1280 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S 229, 254 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurr-
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V. SYLLOGISM: FouR LOGICAL RESULTS
The metaphysical difference between the dissenters' view of Griggs
and the analysis announced in Watson and Atonio probably boils down
to the question whether a claim of disparate impact currently has any
ultimate reference to discriminatory intent despite the specific language
in Griggs to the contrary. 1" The practical differences between these two
views, however, are whether the burden of persuasion is shifted by a prima
facie case of disparate impact; whether a prima facie case may be easily
established by statistics reflecting merely a significant imbalance;
whether the evidence must show indispensable business necessity or mere-
ly a reasonable relationship to a legitimate business purpose; and whether
the burden in all cases which reach the third stage is to show intentional
discrimination. 4 It is toward the resolution of these more practical ques-
tions that the Court has addressed its more recent holdings.
The application of Rule 301 as a pure Thayer definition of presump-
tions to Title VII disparate impact litigation results in the conslusions
discussed earlier."5 The deicisions of the Supreme Court since Albemarle,
particularly Watson and Atonio, approach this convergence to a signifi-
cant degree in each of these four areas.
"1 Justice O'Connor states the most recent answer to this question:
Nor do we think it is appropriate to hold a defendant liable for unintentional discrimina-
tion on the basis of less evidence than is required to prove intentional discrimination.
Rather, the necessary premise of the disparate impact approach is that some employ-
ment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in opera-
tion be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S Ct. at 2785. This concept was also evident in Justice
O'Connor's approach to the effect of direct evidence of discrimination in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
109 S Ct. at 1803-04 ("While the prima facie case under McDonell Douglas and the statistical showing
of imbalance involved in an impact case may both be indicators of discrimination or its 'functional
equivalent: they are not, in and of themselves, the evils Congress sought to eradicate from the employ-
ment setting.") Cf City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S 702, 710 n.20
("Griggs does not imply, and this Court has never held, that discrimination must always be inferred
from such consequences."); Rutherglen, supra note 14, at 1311; Reynard, supra note 109, at 309,
312 n.150; Survey, Leading Cases - 1987 Term, 102 HAIv. L. REv. 143, 317-20 & n.60 [hereinafter
1987 Term].
'" Cf Furnish, supra note 9, at 438. Professor Furnish recognized this convergence, but disregarded
the analytical importance of Rule 301. See also Note, Judicial Dualism, supra note 9, at 408-19;
Alberti, Rebutting the Griggs Prima Facie Case Under Title VII: Limiting Judicial Review of Less
Restrictive Alternatives, 1981 ILL. L. REV. 181; Chamallas, supra note 31, at 320-21; Lamber, supra
note 109, at 8, 10; Terrell, supra note 6.
I" See supra text at 110-11.
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A. Second Stage's Burden of Proof
If Rule 301 is applied to Title VII litigation, the burden of proof that
is shifted can only be one of production or articulation. This is the clearest
mandate of Rule 301: "[A] presumption imposes on the party against
whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut
or meet the presumption."116 Justice O'Connor was unusually casual but
perfectly clear in announcing this result in Watson: "[tihus, when a plain-
tiff has made out a prima facie case of disparate impact, and when the
defendant has met its burden of producing evidence that its employment
practices are based on legitimate business reasons" 17 There are no cita-
tions to authority or logic. Rule 301 is not mentioned. Justice White was
less casual in Atonio: "[in this phase, the employer carries the burden
of producing evidence of a business justification for his employment prac-
tice.... This rule conforms with the usual method for allocating persua-
sion and production burdens in the federal courts, see Fed. Rule Evid.
301-7118
While this result was first explicitly announced by the plurality in
Watson, it is derived from the logic of legal scholarship on evidentiary
presumptions, perhaps best exemplified by Professor Wigmore; it is con-
sistent with the Court's decisions since Albemarle; and it is not adequately
answered by the dissents of Justices Stevens in Atonio and Blackmun
in Watson.
1. Logic
As discussed above, for seventy five years between the publication
of Professor Thayer's treatise in 1898 and the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1974, legal scholars debated the proper function
of evidentiary presumptions. Wigmore's argument for accepting the
Thayer version of presumptions paints an example which is easily
analogized to the discrimination question. Professor Wigmore supposes
"o Fed. R. Evid. 301. See 1 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 63, § 70, at 564. But cf Player,
The Evidentiary Nature of Defendant's Burden in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 49 Mo. L.
REV. 17, 31-38 (denying the propriety of using inferred facts to rebut a presumption).
117 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S Ct. at 2790.
"' Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 & Ct. at 2126.
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that the sole issue in a case is the death of X. Plaintiff has a doctor testify
that X was well-known to the witness and that the witness attended X
in his last illness and saw him die. Now, if no further evidence is introduc-
ed, plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict. The evidence - standing
alone - possesses such overwhelming force that plaintiff will win a
directed verdict if the defendant remains silent. Yet, if the defendant comes
forward with evidence, for example, that X and Y were twins and the doc-
tor treated Y, defendant takes away from plaintiff the benefit plaintiff
would derive from the probative force of his evidence standing alone.
Defendant could accomplish this purpose even if his evidence were of very
questionable credibility. The defendant probably could not accomplish
this merely by asserting that X was alive without presenting some positive
evidence of this assertion. Assume, on the other hand, that the legislature
created a presumption of death from seven years absence without tidings
and assume plaintiff relies solely on this presumption to establish the
death of X, there is really nothing paradoxical in equating the presump-
tive evidence of death with the direct evidence of death. In both situa-
tions, absent any evidence from defendant, plaintiff wins. In both situa-
tions, if defendant introduces sufficient evidence to avoid a directed ver-
dict, the case goes to the jury. Arguably, it is paradoxical to view the two
situations as substantially different. Thus, it is unreasonable to impute
to the legislature the intention that the indirect evidence determined
by it to create a presumption should have greater force than plaintiff's
direct evidence; it is irrational to take something which is naturally
weaker than something else (seven years' disappearance is weaker,
naturally, than the doctor's direct evidence) and infuse it with artificial
force to make it stronger.19
An analogous example can be hypothesized with respect to Title VII.
Defendant A selects employees for manufacturing jobs by use of a
mechanical ability test which he has been using for the last 40 years.
Defendant A has never had a policy of discriminating on the basis of race.
The mechanical ability test has a disparate impact against minorities.
Across the street, his direct competitor B chooses employees for the same
sort of job by a personal unstructured interview, a procedure that was
established on July 1, 1965, immediately before Title VII became effective
"9 9 WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 2493g, at 334-36 (quoting Chadbourn, A Study Relating to the
Uniform Rules of Evidence - Burden of Producing Evidence, Burden of Proof, and Presumptions,
6 CALwOm NA LAW REVISION COISSION REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 1047 (1964)).
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Previously B had declined to hire any minorities, and made statements
that found their way into the record that he would never hire minorities,
and, if forced to do so, would hire as few as possible. Because of automa-
tion, during the last 20 years B has not hired many new employees at
all, and very few during the last few years, thereby making any statistical
analysis impracticable.
Both employers are charged with racial discrimination in violation
of Title VII. Under the dissenter's theory of the shifting burden of per-
suasion, A bears a far higher burden of proof in defense than B, even
though there appears to be direct evidence of discrimination by B. This
burden (unlike the hypothetical presumption of death) has never been
explicitly - or probably implicitly - approved by Congress.2 ° Under Rule
301, shifting only the burden of production, the two employers bear the
same burden. It is this reasoning that persuaded the Watson four.2'
2. Precedents: Between Albemarle and Watson: Dothard, Beazer, and Teal
The Supreme Court's holdings and dicta in Title VII cases following
Albemarle reflect ambiguity as to the actual burden that is shifted by
the prima facie case, if not support for a burden only of production.!2
The Supreme Court in the 1978 case of Dothard v. Rawlinson, did
not focus on what burden of proof is shifted by a prima facie case. The
Court states that "the employer must meet 'the burden of showing that
any given requirement [has]... a manifest relationship to the employ-
ment in question; " citing Griggs.!23 However, (then) Justice Rehnquist
in concurrence explicitly described the burden of proof as one of "articula-
tion" in disparate impact cases, a description not disavowed by the ma-
jority.!24 No other member of the Court disavowed this description.
Cf Gold, Reply to Thomson, 8 INDus. REL. L.J. 117 (1986); Rutherglen, supra note 14, at 1308-09.
But see Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2129 & n.9, 10-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Thomson, The Disparate
Impact Theory: Congressional Intent in 1972 - A Response to Gold, 8 INDUs. REL. L.J. 105 (1986).
But see also S. 2104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2 & 3, 136 Cong. Rec. (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) [hereinafter
S 2104].
... Watson, 108 S Ct. at 2785. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 & Ct. at 1801-02 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("That the employer's burden in rebutting such an inferential case of discrimination
is only one of production does not mean that the scales should be weighted in the same manner
where there is direct evidence of intentional discrimination"); id at 1803 ("I believe there are signifi-
cant differences between shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer in a case resting purely
on statistical proof as in the disparate impact setting and shifting the burden of persuasion in a
case like this one, where an employee has demonstrated by direct evidence that an illegitimate fac-
tor played a substantial role in a particular employment decision.") See also NAACP v. Medical Center,
Inc., 657 F.2d at 1335. But see Smith, supra note 41, at 394 n.1 12; Middleton, supra note 34, at 203-04.
" Reynard, supra note 109, at 306.
" Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S at 329.
1 Id. at 340 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See Note, Judicial Dualism, supra note 9, at 410-11.
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The circumstances in Dothard are consistent with Justice Rehnquist's
formulation. The majority described the minimal elements of the defen-
dant's burden - elements not found in the record before them:
In the district court, however, the appellants produced no
evidence correlating the ... requirements with requi-
site[s]. thought essential to good job performance. Indeed,
they failed to offer evidence of any kind in specific justification
of the.. . standards" 2
The defendant relied in part on its claim that the fact that the criteria
in question were required by state statute itself constituted a sufficient
showing that the criteria were "job related "'126 The Court found that the
employer failed to "produce" or "offer" this evidence.!2 7 This is the same
minimum evidentiary standard of articulation required of disparate treat-
ment defendants. Justice Rehnquist in concurring with the majority's
conclusion is quite explicit in describing the employer's burden:
[Hiere, the district court permissibly concluded that ap-
pellants had not shown enough of a nexus even to rebut the in-
ference [arising from a prima facie case].
Appellants, in order to rebut the prima facie case under the
statute, had the burden placed on them to advance job-related
reasons for the qualification. McDonnell Douglas Corp v.
Green .... This burden could be shouldered by offering evidence
or by making legal arguments not dependent on any new
evidence. . . .[128]
But once the burden has been placed on the defendant, it
is then up to the defendant to articulate the asserted job-related
reasons underlying the use of the minima: McDonnell Douglas
Corp u Green... ; Griggs u Duke Power Ca .. .; Albemarle Paper
Ca v. Moody .... As appellants did not even present the...
contention to the District Court as an asserted job-related reason
for the qualification requirements, I agree that their burden
was not met.2 9
11 Dothard, 433 U.S at 331 (footnote omitted).
1 Id. n.14.
' Cf Note, Judicial Dualisi, supra note 9, at 410-11. See discussion on Sweeney infra at 145-48.
But see Furnish, supra note 9, at 428.
'uBut see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S at 255 & n.9.
1" Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S at 339-40 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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One year later the Court in Beazer noted that plaintiffs had the
"ultimate burden of proving a violation of Title VII"'130 Professor Belton
recognized that "[ilf the analysis in Beazer were adopted as a general
rule in disparate impact cases.., then the burden imposed upon a defend-
ant after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case would be, in effect,
the same as the 'articulation' burden adopted in the disparate treatment
cases."s1
The subsequent decision in Teal v. Connecticut132 did not repudiate
this reasoning. In Teal, the issue was strictly the question of how a prima
facie case of disparate impact is shown and whether there is a defense
that the employer's total selection rate was not disproportionate: the "bot-
tom line."' 13 The nature of the burden of proof imposed on the employer
by the showing of the prima facie case of disparate impact is not discussed
because the district court "held that the employer was not required to
demonstrate that the promotional examination was job related" The
court makes passing references to the defendant's burden to "show"' 13
and to "demonstrate. "'1 3 As discussed below, such references fail to
establish any clear distinction with respect to the meaning of these terms
in the light of Sweeney.
The holdings of Dothard, Albemarle, and, indeed, Griggs were that
the evidence submitted - all of it in Griggs and Dothard and a large
part of it in Albemarle - did not support even an inference that the
criterion at issue related to such a business purpos. 37 Such evidence must
be more than a "scintilla" of evidence,13s and the belief of the employer
that the test was job-related is irrelevant to the question of whether the
evidence in fact supported such an inference.
Dothard, Beazer, and Teal confirm the general teaching of both
Albemarle and McDonnell Douglas, as well as Watson, that rebuttal to
10 440 U.S. at 587 n.31 (Stevens, J.).
.. Belton, supra note 11, at 1247 (footnotes omitted); Furnish, supra note 9, at 438 n.174; Lamber,
supra note 109, at 22; Note, Judicial Dualism, supra note 9, at 411-15. But see Lamber, supra note
109, at 23-29. Justice White's dissent in United States u South Carolina barely touches on this issue,
referring to the State's "carr[ying] its burden of justifying the test despite its disparate racial im-
pact." 434 U.S. 1026, 1027 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). See Alberti, supra note 114, at 192 n.64.
in 457 U.S 440 (1982).
1 Id. at 442.
'8 Id. at 445. For the same reason, the third stage is not explicated.
'"Id. at 445, 446, 450.
13 Id. at 446.
Similarly, the Court found that no proof of business purpose had been introduced below in
its disparate impact analysis of Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S 136, 143 (1977).
11 9 WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 2494, at 384; MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK, supra note 75, at 789
& n.29; Furnish, supra note 9, at 427-28.
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a prima facie case must consist of at least an articulation of the actual
reason for an employment decision. Such evidence cannot be a mere denial
of discriminatory intent, nor the introduction of policies prohibiting
discrimination.3 " "[Tihe defendant's explanation.., must be clear and
reasonably specific .... This obligation arises ... from the necessity of
rebutting the inference of discrimination "' 140 It must be positive evidence
of the actual purpose or motivation for the specific employment decision
or procedurell
This teaching is consistent with Rule 301, which itself requires that
the prima facie showing is rebutted only if the defendant introduces
evidence supporting the inference that the challenged employment deci-
sion was based on a specific reason.'4' Evidence only asserting that the
reason was not based on a prohibited criterion is not sufficient. 43 The
question at issue, however, is exclusively one of relevance, in an eviden-
tiary sense, of the evidence. If the evidence is relevant to, i.e, supports
an inference that the selection procedure advances a specific, articulated
purpose, it meets the burden of articulation. Dothard, Beazer, and Teal
hold that the defendants had failed to meet their burden at the second
stage, but present this holding in language consistent with the burden
of production.
I" In Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), the Supreme Court was
faced with the minimum evidence needed to rebut the prima facie case of disparate treatment:
Hazelwood offered virtually no additional evidence in response, relying instead on
evidence introduced by the Government, perceived deficiencies in the Government's
case, and its own officially promulgated policy "to hire all teachers on the basis of train-
ing, preparation and recommendations, regardless of race, color, or creed. [The defend-
ants offered only one witness, who testified to the total number of teachers who ap-
plied and were hired for jobs in the 1971-1972 and 1972-1973 school years. They in-
troduced several exhibits, consisting of a policy manual, policy book, staff handbook,
and historical summary of Hazelwood's formation and relatively brief existence.]
Id. at 303-304 & n.6 (footnote inserted in text). This evidence was deemed insufficient to rebut the
Government's case. See also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S at 631-32.
" Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258; WEIrNsTEN, supra note 49,
1 301103], at 301-45. Cf. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497-500 (1977). See also Burdine, 450
U.S at 255 n.9.
141 Burdine, 450 U.S at 254-55; See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. at 631-32; Middleton, supra
note 34 at 202.
i 10 MOORE'S, supra note 68, § 301.05, at 111-24 n.2. ("The contradictory proof, however, must
be such that it would support a finding of the non-existence of the presumed fact, although it need
not be believed."); THAYER, supra note 19, at 336 ("[Tlhere is meant such an amount of evidence
or reason as may render the view contended for rationally probable:'); Smalls, The Burden of Proof
in Title VII Cases, 25 How. L.J. 247, 262-63 & n.96 (1982).
", Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
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3. Precedents: Burdine
The decision in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,"
a disparate treatment case, indicated that the Supreme Court would
ultimately conform all of Title VII practice to the Rules of Evidence. This
opinion precisely analyzes Rule 301 and its effects on all civil litigation.
The opinion, admittedly, is not entirely unambiguous as to its coverage
of both disparate impact and disparate treatment cases. 45 The more ex-
tensive application of Burdine arises from Justice Powell's substantive
and scholarly discussion of the shifting burden of proof, the nature of the
presumption, and the nature of the rebuttal. These issues are discussed
and authorities cited in terms applicable not only to all Title VII claims,
but to all civil litigation before the Federal courts.W 4 Except for the
references noted above, the language does not suggest that these rules
do not apply to disparate impact cases. Justice Powell discussed first the
ultimate burden of the plaintiff.
The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant should
be understood in the light of the plaintiffs ultimate and in-
termediate burden. The ultimate burden of persuading the trier
of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remains at all time with the plaintiff. See Board
of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, . . . [Disparate
14 450 U.S 248.
In the preamble to the decision, Justice Powell states:
This case requires us to address again the nature of the evidentiary burden placed
upon the defendant in an employment discrimination suit brought under Title VII ....
The narrow question presented is whether, after the plaintiff has proved a prima facie
case of discriminatory treatment, the burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the
court by a preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for the challenged employment action existed.
Id. at 249-50. After discussing the facts, Justice Powell acknowledged that McDonnell Douglas Corp
u Green was a Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment, id. at 252-53, and in a footnote
to this sentence, stated:
We have recognized that the factual issues, and therefore the character of the evidence
presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that a facially neutral employment policy
has a discriminatory impact on protected classes. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S
at 802, n. 14, 93 S Ct., at 1824 n. 14; Teamsters u United States, 431 U.S 324, 335-36,
and n. 15, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1854-1855, n. 15, 52 L.Ed. 2d 396 (1977).
Id. at 253 n.5, Thereafter, Justice Powell discusses how a prima facie case of disparate treatment
is established. Id. at 253-54. The distinctions are thus described as merely differences in the character
and nature of the evidence produced. See NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d at 1335 n. 15.
Belton, supra note 11, at 1245, inexplicably suggests that these statements implicitly suggest a
repudiation of the three part test in disparate impact established in Albemarle.
1 4 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-56. Cf Furnish, supra note 9, at 435; Procedural Subversion, supra
note 18, at 1000. The Court has now explicitly revealed that Burdine applies to all Title VII litiga-
tion. Wards Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. at 2126 ("This rule... more specifically... conforms
to the rule in disparate treatment cases that the plaintiff bears the burden of disproving an employer's
assertion that the adverse employment action or practice was based solely on a legitimate neutral
consideration. See Texas Dept of Community Affairs u Burdine")
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treatment case]. See generally 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence Section
2489 (3d Ed. 1940) (the burden of persuasion "never shifts").
The McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary
burdens serves to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously
and fairly to this ultimate question. 4 7
Justice Powell then discussed the prima facie case:
The prima facie case serves an important function in the litiga-
tion: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons
for the plaintiff's rejection. See Teamsters v. United
States.. .. As the court explained in Furnco Construction Ca
v. Waters ... the prima facie case "raises an inference of
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if other-
wise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the con-
sideration of impermissible factors." Establishment of the prima
facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer
unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of
fact believes plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent
in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment
for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.
48
The language again applied to all civil litigation, Title VII and other-
wise. The effect of a prima facie case is consistent with the nature of a
"presumption" under Rule 301. The third matter taken up by Justice
Powell is the specific nature of the burden that is shifted.
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut
the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that
the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not
persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the prof-
fered reasons. See Sweeney, supra, at 25 .... It is sufficient if
the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. To accomplish
this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduc-
tion of admissible evidence, the reasons for plaintiff's rejection.
[An articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice.
Thus, the defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an
answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel.] The ex-
planation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judg-
"4 Burdine, 450 US. at 253.
'~' Id. at 253-54 (footnote omitted).
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ment for the defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of
production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is
rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of
specificity. Placing this burden of production on the defendant
thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima facie
case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to
frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plain-
tiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.
The sufficiency of the defendant's evidence should be evaluated
by the extent to which it fulfills these functions 49
On the whole, Burdine was not cast as a discussion on the way to litigate
one type of Title VII case, it was a discussion of the effects of presump-
tions in civil litigation in general, and the effects of this general doctrine
on Title VII litigation. There is not a word in the opinion suggesting that
this doctrine did not apply with equal force to disparate impact cases.
4. Objections: Justice Stevens
The most fundamental objection to the thesis here offered is that a
prima facie case of disparate impact is simply not governed by Rule 301!-'°
This objection is grounded on the Court's observation that while Rule
301 governs all presumptions, it does not govern all rules shifting burdens
of proof. This argument - implicitly based on the decision in Transpor-
tation Management - was advanced by Justice Stevens in his Atonio dis-
sent.!51
In NLRB u Transportation Management Corp ,152 the Court was faced
with a situation in which the General Counsel of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board had established that an employer had fired an employee
because of protected union activities. The employer responded that, even
if union activity had been one of the motivating factors, the employee
would have been fired in any event because of other unsatisfactory con-
duct. The employer contended that Rule 301 placed the burden of per-
suasion on the General Counsel to show that the employee would not
have been fired. The Board held that, since the General Counsel had
shown that union activity was one motive of the employer, the employer
would have the burden to prove that the employee still would have been
fired without considering his union activity. Discussing Rule 301, the
Court said:
"'Id. at 254-55 (footnote inserted into text.)5 See 21 WIGHT & GRAHAm, supra note 49, § 5724, at 585-86. But see 1 LoUISELL & MUELLER,
supra note 63, § 67, at 539.
l Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2130-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Smith,
supra note 41, at 394.
'5 462 U.S 393 (1983).
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The Rule merely defines the term "presumption." It in no way
restricts the authority of a court or an agency to change the
customary burdens of persuasion in a manner that otherwise
would be permissible. Indeed, were respondent correct, we could
not have assigned to the defendant the burden of persuasion
on one issue in Mount Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)!53
The Board had considered the employer's burden to be in the nature of
"an affirmative defense,"'15 and "[t]he Board has instead chosen to
recognize, as it insists it has done for many years, what it designates as
an affirmative defense that the employer has the burden of sustaining."15
Similarly, the burden announced in Mount Healthy Board of Education
u Doyle, was a non-statutory and analogous affirmative defense.'5 ' The
Court has recognized other affirmative defenses without express statutory
authority.57
An affirmative defense has the nature of a confession and avoidance
in that it assumes (at least arguendo) initial liability and shows by ex-
trinsic evidence that no remedy - or ultimate liability for that matter
- should attach!" It fits into the three stage order and allocation of proof
as a "fourth stage."' 5 9 Such a defense admits that there has in fact been
I" Id. at 404 n.7.
11 Id. at 401.
Id. at 402.
15 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
157E., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,436 (1932) (entrapment); Davis v. United States,
469 U.S. 1156 (1985) (insanity).1
" See FED. R. Civ. P 8(c). See also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2131 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (justification or excuse); THAYER, supra note 19, at 356 ("new and distinct fact"); id
at 368-69 ("An admission may, of course, end the controversy; but such an admission may be, and
not yet end it; and if that be so, it is because the party making the admission sets up something
that avoids the apparent effect of it; as subsequent payment avoids the effect of what shows a claim
in contract."); id at 376 (equitable defenses) (cited in Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2131 n.15 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)); C. LANGDELL, EQurry PLEADING §§ 108-114 (2d ed. 1883); ABA, PROCEEDINGS, INSTITUTE
ON THE FEDERAL RULEs OF CmrL PROCEDURE 49 (1939); Belton, supra note 11, at 1257-58 & n.229.
See also Allen, Presumptions, supra note 12, at 849-50; Belton, supra note 11, at 1214, 1260; McCoR-
MICK'S HANDBOOK, supra note 75, at 8. Cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1811 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) ("there by definition [illegitimate cause] is the but-for cause of the employment
decision, and the only question remaining is how the employer can justify it.") But cf Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S, 109, 117 (1943); MCCORICK, supra note 64, at 15.
15 Thus, the Hopkins analysis is not an alternative to the Burdine and McDonnell Douglas analysis
(But see Hopkins, 109 S, Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ) or to the Albermarle and Watson
analysis, but rather is a subsequent analysis. Disparate treatment and disparate impact are alter-
native (but not exclusive alternatives) means by which to establish that the employment decision
was (decisively or merely substantially) caused by discrimination or its "functional equivalent.'
Once this stage has been reached, Hopkins 109 S. Ct. at 1795 (Brennan, J.), then - and only then
- is the Hopkins analysis available or necessary to establish that the same result would have oc-
curred (or, its equivalent, that no harm would have resulted to the employee from the discriminatory
factor in the employment decision). However, the Hopkins analysis will govern in every case in which
this stage of the order of proof is reached. Hopkins, 109 S Ct. at 1795; Player, supra note 116, at
30 n.40. But see id., at 1806 ("limited number," "closely defined set of cases") (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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been discrimination and then justifies this admitted discrimination. This
is essentially an interpretation of the substantive law, and neither Rule
8(c) itself nor federal case law provide a universal test to determine
whether a defense not enumerated in Rule 8(c) must be so pled.60
The best examples of Title VII affirmative defenses are those recog-
nized by the Court in Dothard and more recently in Hopkins. In both in-
stances the Court had found that there had been an impermissible cause
for an employment decision. In Dothard, the Court found that the
employer had offered sufficient evidence to convince the court that gender
was a bona fide occupational qualification.'' In Hopkins, the Court
remanded for a decision whether the employer had or could offer suffi-
cient evidence to convince the trial court that "when the situation is
viewed hypothetically and after the fact, the same decision would have
been made even in the absence of discrimination." ' "
Justice Stevens, in his Atonio dissent, argues that the employer's show-
ing in a disparate impact case is such an affirmative defense. "But when
an employer is faced with sufficient proof of disparate impact, its only
recourse is to justify the practice by explaining why it is necessary to
the operation of business. Such a justification is a classic example of an
affirmative defense.""" An argument could logically be made that the
employer's showing is an affirmative defense. Justice Stevens certainly
attempts this. But Justice Stevens - contrary to his own assertion"6
I" THAYER, supra note 19, at 370-76; Belton, supra note 11, at 1215. Cf Note, Constitutionality
of Rebuttable Statutory Presumptions, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 539 (1955).
Rule 301 also limits the power of the courts to shift the burden of persuasion by requiring all
such shifts to be treated as affirmative defenses. In contrast, Congress may shift the burden of per-
suasion without triggering the procedural formalities of an affirmative defense by creating a statutory
"Morgan" presumption. See Allen, Anatomy, supra note 84, at 906. Justice Stevens' dissent con-
forms to this limitation by largely abandoning the prima facie terminology of Albermarle and subse-
quent cases. Atonio, 109 & Ct. at 2127-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting); But see id at 2131, 2135 (using
term "prima facie").
"I Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 332-37; Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1789 (Brennan, J.); id at
1811 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See § 703(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e) (1982)). Cf Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261, 2261-67 (1989).
161 Hopkins, 109 S Ct. at 1788 n.. Perhaps a third example of an affirmative defense is also
to be inferred from Hopkins: Where discrimination has been established to be a cause of the employ-
ment decision, such an established claim of "reverse" discrimination is defeated by convincing the
court that the decision was made pursuant to a legitimate affirmative action plan. Hopkins, 109
S Ct. at 1805-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id at 1813 n. 4 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia,
J., dissenting); cf Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (White, J., dissenting).
' Atonio, 109 S Ct. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also id n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing FED. R. Crv. P. 8(c) and THAYER, supra note 19, at 368-69); Smith, supra note 41, at 394; Zuck,
supra note 13, at 546-50. Thus, the essence of Title VII would not be prohibiting discrimination,
but assuring proportionality whenever feasible.
18 Atonio, 109 S Ct. at 2127 ("longstanding rule of law"); id at 2132 ("the statutory construc-
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- is not standing with fifteen years of consistent Title VII jurisprudence;
he stands against it. Justice Stevens and his colleagues, at the very least,
introduce a new terminology, if not a new concept, into Title VII law.6
s
In the disparate impact cases between Albemarle and Atonio, the
employer's showing in defense has never been referred to by any member
of the Court as an affirmative defense!" Since Albemarle, it has always
been characterized as a rebuttal to a prima facie case! 7 It is not among
the defenses listed in Rule 8(c). Additionally, Title VII practice has been
inconsistent with such an analysis. The employer's responsive showing
has not been required to be plead as an affirmative defense under Rule
8(c),168 nor has failure so to plead been deemed a waiver of the defense,
as with true affirmative defenses. 69
The situation in Mt. Healthy and Transportation Management and
the rebuttal to a prima facie case in Title VII are thus fundamentally
different. In the two former cases the existence of a prohibited purpose
as one motivation for the defendant's conduct (causing plaintiff's injury)
had already been established. Defendants were seeking to show that the
same conduct would have occurred (causing plaintiff the same injury)
because the conduct would have been motivated by legitimate, un-
prohibited purposes. In the Title VII prima facie case and its rebuttal,
the existence of the prohibited motivation (discrimination or its "func-
tional equivalent," disparate impact) as even one causal factor for the
defendant's conduct had not only not yet been established, but the ex-
istence of that factor was the exclusive focus of the proceeding. Once the
existence of this factor as a motivation of the defendant's conduct is
established by the preponderance of the evidence, then - and only then
I" A discussion of the proclivity of the affirmative defense concept where applied to Title VII
litigation to lead to racial preferences and quotas is to be found at Cox, supra note 12, passim; Scharf,
supra note 17, at 23940, 244-52. Such a policy analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. On the
other hand, this concept can also lead to the contention that overt and intentional racial discrimination
can be justified by an affirmative defense of "business necessity." Note, Defining the Proper Scope
of the Business Necessity Defense in Title VII Litigation, 30 CATH. U.L. REv. 653 (1981). Cf § 4(b),
S 2104, supra note 120.
I" See NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc, 657 F2d at 1333-36. But see Guardians Assoc v. Civil
Service Comm'n., 463 U.S 582, 598 (1983) (White, J., announcing judgment) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring in part) (Title VI case discussing Title VII analysis); eg Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc, 773
F.2d 561, 571-72 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. City of Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218, 231-33 (N.D.
111. 1976).
167 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S at 425; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S at 329; New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 584; id at 602 (White, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S at 446; Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S.Ct. at
2787; id at 2792 (Blackmun, concurring).
16 See Belton, supra note 11, at 1259 ("If Congress has in fact imposed upon the defendant the
burden of persuasion on business necessity, then this defense should be treated as an affirmative
defense under Rule 8(c), and the defendant should be required to plead it"); Gomez v. Toledo, 446
U.S 635, 640 (1980); Allen, Presumption4 supra note 12, at 849-50. But see also Gomez v. Toledo,
446 U.S at 642 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); cf Bohlen, supra note 54, at 308.
1' See 2A MooRE's, supra note 68, 8.27[3], at 8-251 to 8-253.
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- may a defense analogous to that in Mt. Healthy and Transportation
Management be relevant to show that the same conduct would have been
motivated by lawful purposes.
Moreover, the law recognizes two types of prima facie cases. The first
type of prima facie case is where the established facts create a presump-
tion of liability, the legal consequences of which are governed by Rule
301!70 Additionally, Justice Powell notes in Burdine that the term "prima
facie case" can mean merely offering sufficient relevant evidence to allow
also the finder of fact to preclude dismissal 171 and to "get to the jury. 17 2
This type of prima facie case is established where the evidence allows,
but does not compel, an inference of ultimate liability - in Title VII cases
discrimination - and precludes dismissal at the close of plaintiff's
evidence.!"2 Thus, if a prima facie case of disparate impact were not a
presumption, then it would be merely the minimum proof necessary "to
get to the jury.' 174 Such a classification would accord the prima facie case
of disparate impact even less strength than a presumption under Rule
301.'75 In any event, a Title VII "prima facie case" is clearly a presump-
tion. "McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent that in the Ti-
tle VII context we use 'prima facie case' in the former sense.' 7 6 Another
footnote in Burdine also clarifies that burden-shifting effect of a prima
facie case is a "presumption":
But cf ScmEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 1325-26 (declining to discuss prima facie case
as presumption).
"I Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 US. at 254 n.7 ("The phrase 'prima facie
case' may denote not only the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but
also may be used by courts to describe the plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to per-
mit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue." 9 WIGMORE, supra note 62, at § 2494; Ladd, supra
note 49, at 278-79; 1 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 63, § 67, at 537; ScHLEi & GROSSMAN, supra
note 10, at 1325-26; Zuck, supra note 13, at 543 n.44; Belton, supra note 11, at 1214 n.32, 1222;
Terrell, supra note 6, at 308-10.
I Obviously a metaphor, and perhaps a useful one. Ordinarily, there is no jury in Title VII
litigation.
17' See Belton, supra note 11, at 1236. Professor Belton additionally uses the term prima facie
case also to refer to instances where the plaintiff has established by a preponderance of the evidence
that conduct was motivated by a forbidden purpose and the defendant seeks to show a "same result"
defense. He cites Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.s
252, 270-71 n.21 (1979) ("threshold showing") and Mt. Healthy, neither of which refer to this show-
ing as a prima facie case. Belton, supra note 11, at 1247-50. Cf Zuck, supra note 13, at 554-56.
See also discussion, infra at 148-53.
... See Zuck, supra note 13, at 543.
171 Professor Belton suggests that McDonnell Douglas and Albemarle do not unequivocally state
that the prima facie case creates a presumption and not merely an inference, 4e, merely sufficient
evidence to get to the jury. Belton, supra note 11, at 1235-36. This is consistent with 21 WRIGHT
& GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5122, at 571, that "[ulniike the Thayer-Wigmore presumption.., the
proponent [of the presumed fact] is not entitled to a directed verdict [under Rule 3011 if the oppo-
nent introduces no evidence of the non-existence of the presumed fact" However, Burdine establishes
that Rule 301 creates a presumption which compels the appropriate inference in the absence of con-
tradicting evidence. Burdine, 450 U.S at 253.
'" Burdine, 450 U.S at 254 n.7; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S at 309, n.44 (1978);
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S at 714. See CAL. EVIDENCE CODE
§ 602 (West 1966). Cf Allen, Anatomy, supra note 84, at 911.
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Usually, assessing the burden of production helps the judge
determine whether the litigants have created an issue of fact
to be decided by the jury. In a Title VII case, the allocation of
burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment
of a prima facie case is intended progressively to sharpen the
inquiry into the illusive factual question of intentional
discrimination 7
Albemarle Dothard, Beazer, and Teal do not suggest otherwise.
Where a prima facie case raises a presumption, it must be governed
by Rule 301, and thus by Thayer, unless it is either a statutory excep-
tion or a surviving non-statutory Morgan presumption. One district court,
confronted with Rule 301, held that the presumption shifting the burden
of persuasion in disparate impact was created by statute and thus ex-
cepted from Rule 301.78 The court, however, prudently declined to cite
any statutory language creating this supposed exception. 79 On the other
hand, no court has expressly stated that the presumption in disparate
impact is a non-statutory exception, and only a very few have claimed
that there are any non-statutory exceptions to Rule 301. But if a prima
facie case of disparate impact is not a presumption, it has no defined place
in general rules of evidence and litigation practice. It is unique and sui
generis. As such it constitutes precisely one of those alleged exceptions
in civil rights cases to general law disparaged by the Court in a number
of cases.!8
Justice Stevens's contention thus contradicts the long-standing
characterization of the employer's burden and the law of presumptions
as it has been developed by both the courts and the Congress.
177 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8.
United States v. City of Chicago, 411 F. Supp 218,231-33 (N.D. 111. 1976); 1 LOUIELL & MUELLER,
supra note 63, § 65, at 520 & n.6; § 70, at 565. But see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.
Ct. at 2132 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also S 1261, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec.
S7513 (daily ed. June 23, 1989) (creating statutory "Morgan" presumption).
179 The statutory language most plausibly creating this exception, § 703(h) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (codified at 42 U.SC. § 2000e-2(h) (1982)), would apply only to "ability tests!' In rele-
vant part, it provides, "(Nior shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give
and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended, or used to discriminate because
of race, [etc.]:' See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 433-36; Belton, supra note 11, at 1232.
But see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 343-56. Accord, California
Brewers As'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S 598 (1980) (703(h) requires proof of intent to discriminate). Disparate
impact, however, as Watson held, is much broader, and applies to any selection procedure or criterion.
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2786-87; id at 2791-92 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
id at 2797 (Stevens, J., concurring). Further, statutory presumptions excepted from Rule 301 are
created by language far more specific in operative effect than Section 703(h). See, eg, Wilson v.
Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 669 (1979) (25 U.S.C. § 194); 21 WmoHT & GRAHAM, supra note
49, § 5123, at 582-83.
'" See 1 LouSELL & MUELLER, supra note 63, § 68, at 540; cf Allen, Anatomy, supra note 84,
at 912. But see WEnsTrni, supra note 49, 301[02], at 301-32 & n.12, 301-43 to 301-48; 21 WmGHT
& GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5123, at 578-79.
11 See supra note 6.
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5. Objections: Justice Blackmun
An objection articulately raised by Justice Blackmun in Watson is that
- whatever the logic or the law - the operative words of the Court's
precedents in disparate impact cases clearly require a shifting of the
burden of persuasion. Justice Blackmun makes his case as follows:
Our cases make clear, however, that, contrary to the plurali-
ty's assertion, ante, at 2790, a plaintiff who successfully
establishes this prima facie case shifts the burden of proof, not
production, to the defendant to establish that the employment
practice in question is a business necessity. See, eg, Albemarle
Paper Ca v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,425,95 S.Ct. 2362,45 L.Ed.2d
280 (1975) (employer must "meet the burden of proving that
its tests are 'job related' "); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at
329, 97 S.Ct., at 2727 (employer must "prov[e] that the chal-
lenged requirements are job related"); Griggs u Duke Power Ca,
401 U.S. 424, 432, 91 S.Ct. 849, 854, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) ("Con-
gress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that
any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to
the employment in question") (emphasis added in each).82
The burden of production is allegedly different from the burden described
in Grigg, Albemarle, and Dothard.8 3 The issue is therefore whether the
meaning of the burden "to show," "to prove," and "to demonstrate" cur-
rently is the same as the burden "to persuade," or the burden "to ar-
ticulate" or "to produce evidence"1 84
181 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S Ct. at 2130 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Atonio, 109 S. Ct.
at 2126 ("We acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions can be read as suggesting [a burden
of persuasion]"); Holdeman, Changing Face, supra note 34, at 182, 194-96. But cf SCHLEI & GROSSMAN,
supra note 10, 1328-29.
"' See also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. at 446-47 ("demonstrate"); New York City Transit Auth.
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 ("demonstrate") (1979); id at 602 (White, J., dissenting) ("show"); NAACP
v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d at 1335.
1s, See McCoRMICK, supra note 64, at 635 (" 'Proof is an ambiguous word. We sometimes use
it to mean evidence. ... Sometimes, when we say a thing is 'proved' we mean that we are convinced");
THAYER, supra note 19, at 384 ("the old ambiguity as to probatio and probare'); McCormick, supra
note 64, at 15 ("inexact expression"); Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 25-26, Atonio;
Procedural Subversion, supra note 18, at 1006 n.39. Cf Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory
Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129, 1151 (1980); Friedman, The
Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Litigation. A Critique. 65
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1979).
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The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney,"8 5 suggests the resolution of
this issue. Here the Court was faced with explaining or escaping language
in disparate treatment cases, McDonnell Douglas ("to show"),'" and Furn-
co ("prove"),"8 7 that strongly suggested a burden of persuasion. The First
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a disparate treatment case, had found that
a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas had been made. It then stated
that the burden shifted "requiring the defendant to prove absence of
discriminatory motive"'8 8
The Court found that this language improperly shifted the burden
of persuasion to the employer, and remanded the case. In so doing, the
majority discussed the meaning of the words "articulate," "show:' and
"prove." In describing the employer's burden in Title VII litigation follow-
ing the establishment of a prima facie case, the court states:
While words such as "articulate," "show,' and "prove," may have
more or less similar meanings depending upon the context in
which they are used, we think there is a significant distinction
between merely "articulat[ing] some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason" and "prov[ing] absence of discriminatory
motive." By reaffirming and emphasizing the McDonnell
Douglas analysis in Furnco Construction Ca v. Water, supra,
we made it clear that the former will suffice to meet the
employee's prima facie case of discrimination.
The dissenting opinion in Sweeney, written by Justice Stevens with
whom Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall joined, is particularly il-
luminating. The dissent states its disagreement as follows:
As its sole basis for this conclusion, this Court relies on a distinc-
tion drawn for the first time in this case "between merely 'ar-
ticulate [ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and
'prov[ing] absence of discriminatory motive' [439 U.S.] at 295"'
This novel distinction has two parts, both of which are illusory
and were unequivocally rejected in Furnco itself.
1. 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per curiam).
18 411 U.S. at 792, 802.
187 438 U.s at 577-78.
18 Sweeney, 569 F.2d 169, 177 (1st Cir. 1978).
1 Sweeney, 439 U.S at 25.
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First is a purported difference between "articulating" and
"proving" a legitimate motivation.1 90
Thus, both the majority and the dissent in Sweeney concurred that
"articulate;' "show:' and "prove," generally may have more or less similar
meanings. Where they disagreed was on whether the First Circuit placed
the word "prove" in such a context as to require a meaning different from
"articulating."191 It was not mentioned in Sweeney - and the negative
is 35 weeks pregnant - is whether "articulate," "prove:' and "show" in
a disparate treatment case mean the same thing as those words in
disparate impact cases. 92 The reasoning in Sweeney implicitly leads to
the conclusion that similar language in the classic disparate impact cases,
Griggs and Albemarle, could no longer be taken to impose a burden of
persuasion.
Additionally, the court in Sweeney noted that a shifting burden of per-
suasion was inconsistent with the three stages of proof prescribed in all
Title VII litigation. First, the prima facie case is set forth; second, rebut-
tal evidence is presented; third, the plaintiff may offer pretext evidence.
The court reasoned that a requirement that the defendant (in the second
stage) prove the absence of discriminatory motive "would make entirely
superfluous the third step [pretext] in the Furnco-McDonnell Douglas
analysis, since it would place on the employer at the second stage the
burden of showing that the reason for rejection was not a pretext, rather
than requiring contrary proof from the employee as part of the third
step"' 93 No mention was made of Rule 301'.
190 Id. at 27-28 (footnote omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191 Cf Procedural Subversion, supra note 18, at 1004. Belton, supra note 11, at 1239-40, n.146,
suggests a more substantial difference between the majority and the dissent, but acknowledges that
"[slome courts appear to believe that the Court in Sweeney was unanimous in its view of the obliga-
tion that shifted to the defendant. See e g, Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 65 n.7 (2nd Cir. 1980)."
See also Note, Judicial Dualism, supra note 9, at 409 n.172.
The Court has apparently not escaped from this confusion. Seea g, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.); id at 1796 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 1806 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., dissenting), where it is dif-
ficult to discern whether a member of the Court is referring merely to producing evidence or to
convincing the court of a presumption's basic facts. All members of the Court use these terms without
apparent concern for the two distinct meanings its prior opinions have assigned to them. Professor
Thayer notes that even the best of judges confuse these meanings. THAYER, supra note 19, at 359-60.
Because of the possibility of such confusion, this paper has attempted to avoid terms such as "prove",
"show", or "demonstrate", and instead to use "establish", "convince", or "persuade" or on the other
hand, "produce", "offer", or "present", where applicable. Cf THAYER, supra note 19, at 362.
'" See NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d at 1335. Professor Belton, supra note 11, at 1238,
suggests that the words mean the same, but that all of these words require persuasion. See Silberhorn
v. General Iron Works, 584 F.2d 970, 971 (10th Cir. 1978).
... Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 24 n.1. Professor Belton agrees. Belton, however, would render the alloca-
tion of proof logical by imposing a burden of persuasion at the second stage, and abolishing the third
stage. Belton, supra note 11, at 1212 ("the pretext stage of proof enunciated in McDonnell Douglas
Corp u Green should be eliminated since it allows for the analytically bankrup [sic] possibility that
a court could find both the defense of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason or business justifica-
tion and a pretext in the same case:') See also id. at 1273-74; cf S. 2104, §§ 3 & 4, supra note 120.
'" Cf Mendez, supra note 184, at 111-60; Terrell, supra note 6, at 310-17; Procedural Subver-
sion, supra note 18, it 1006 & n.40.
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Similarly, the third stage of the disparate impact case, pretext," would
also be obviated by imposing a burden on the defendant to persuade the
court that his articulated legitimate business purpose actually motivated
his employment decision.9 6
As Professor Belton recognizes, the disparate impact and disparate
treatment theories are alternative approaches to determinations of
discrimination. There is no reason to create a burden of persuasion vel
burden of production dichotomy between these two modes of analyses.
"The same policy, probability, and fairness considerations apply to a prima
facie case under both theories."197 Thus, the "legitimate business pur-
pose" rebuttal is equally an "act of Congress" as the "legitimate non-
discriminatory reason" rebuttal,'98 and therefore equally within the man-
date of Rule 301.
B. First Stage's Prima Facie Case
Rule 301 does not govern the nature of the basic facts which must
be shown in order to establish a presumption and to shift the burden of
production. It merely governs the nature of the burden of proof that is
thereby shifted. Nevertheless, the logic supporting Rule 301 argues that
the burden should not be onerous, and the Court's decisions agree 99
A presumption is based upon inferences and balances of probabili-
tyOO The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie show-
ing of an unlawful employment practice, ie, the basic facts of the presump-
tion, by a preponderance of the evidence. 0° The finder of fact must be
195 See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. at 447.
'" See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (third stage
abandoned); NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc, 657 F.2d at 1335; Furnish, supra note 9, at 436; Alber-
ti, supra note 114, at 204-05; Reynard, supra note 109, at 307 & n.131. Cf Lamber, supra note 109,
at 12-13. See also text at 161-63.
'97 Belton, supra note 11, at 1267
198 I& Cf Chamallas, supra note 31, at 323.
1
"Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. at 2788-90; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S at 253. Cf Furnish, supra note 9, at 435.But see Middleton, supra note 34, at 203.
10 Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559, 561 (1917) (Holmes, J.) ("A presumption upon a matter
of fact, when it is not merely a disguise for some other principle, means that common experience
shows the fact to be so generally true that the courts may notice the truth."); Laughlin, In Support
of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REV. 195, 211 (1953).
201 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-54; Watson, 108 S Ct. at 2788; 1 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note
63, § 66, at 526. See 56 F.R.D. 208-11 (1972) (Advisory Committee Note); 46 F.R.D. 161,214-15 (1969
Draft, Advisory Committee's Note). 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5125, at 596-603; MORGAN,
BAsIC PROBLEMS, supra note 19, at 34; Prop. FED. R. Evm. 303(cX1)(B), 46 F.R.D. 161,212-19 (1969);
RULE 702, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE ("The basic fact of a presumption may be established in an
action by the pleadings, or by stipulation of the parties, or by judicial notice, or by evidence which
compels a finding of the basic fact, or by a finding of the basic fact from the evidence"); UNIF. R.
Evm. 13 ("facts found or otherwise established in the action.") See Player, supra note 116, at 34;
MCCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK, supra note 75, at 821. Cf 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5125,
at 601 ("[It is critical to distinguish between the basic fact (or facts) of the presumption and the
AKRON LAW REwiEw [Vol. 23:2
44
Akron Law Review, Vol. 23 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss2/1
TITLE VII, RULE 301, AND ATONJO
persuaded that each element of the prima facie case is true - not just
that there is sufficient evidence from which it could so find?2" The facts
necessary to establish a prima facie showing will vary depending on the
particular context and may be established through either direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence0.3 This again is consistent with general evident-
presumed fact."); Allen, Presumption.4 supra note 12, at 852. But cf McCoRMICK, supra note 64, at 7-8.
Justice O'Connor, in a confusing discussion in Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1801-03, uses language
that seems to suggest that the mere offer of evidence of a certain type - direct evidence of
discriminatory intent - should operate as the basic fact of a presumption and shift the burden of
persuasion. This language would apparently not require that the court be persuaded even that the
evidence itself was true, though in Hopkins the evidence at bar - gender stereotyped statements
- was apparently undenied. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1802 ("where there
is direct evidence") (emphasis original); id ("where plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimina-
tion"); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1983) (Tjoflat, J.) ("presen-
ting direct evidence"); Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 935-37 (1st Cir. 1987) ("produced 'strong
evidence'); Thomkins v. Morris Brown College, 752 F.2d 558, 563 (11th Cir. 1985) ("evidence...
shifted burden of persuasion") (cited in Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1802-03. See also Hopkins, 109 S. Ct.
at 1812 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("produced proof"). A shifting of the burden of persuasion upon
merely an offer of evidence would be unique. See authorities cited supra note 6. On the other hand,
Justice O'Connor's language could plausibly be construed to mean that this evidence must be found
to be true in order to operate as the basic fact of a presumption. A shifting of the burden of persua-
sion on such a finding of a basic fact of statements reflecting explicit gender stereotyping would
be a new (but not illogical) presumption falling within the class of "Morgan" presumptions. THAYER,
supra note 19, at 315-31; text supra at 117-19, 144. However, in the absence of direct Congressional
sanction the new presumption's effect of shifting the burden of persuasion - rather than the burden
of production - would be precluded by Rule 301. See text supra at 123-25. A third reading of Justice
O'Connor's discussion is roughly consistent with the plurality's view in Hopkins that where the
plaintiff has established that an illegitimate criterion was a 'substantial factor' in the employment
decision the burden of persuasion is shifted to the defendant, with the Court's view in Transporta-
tion Management and Mt. Healthy, and with the position here advanced. See Hopkins, 109 S. Ct.
at 1804 ("In my view, in order to justify shifting the burden on the issue of causation to the defen-
dant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion
was a substantial factor in the decision."); id at 1805 ("Under my approach, the plaintiff must pro-
duce evidence sufficient to show that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the par-
ticular employment decision such that a reasonable factfinder could draw an inference that the deci-
sion was made 'because of' the plaintiff's protected status."); cf id at 1806 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("proves by direct evidence"). But see supra note 191.
Similarly, Professor Belton is critical of Burdine as adding a "novel requirement" in requiring
a prima facie case to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. He apparently (and perhaps
Justice O'Connor) confuse the two meanings of a prima facie case, where, as discussed supra at 135-36,
a prima facie case sufficient to "get to the jury" imposes only a burden of production or articula-
tion, while a prima facie case sufficient to raise a presumption (Morgan or Thayer) and to shift any
burden of proof, however defined, requires that the basic fact (or facts) be established by a
preponderance of the evidence. Belton, supra note 11, at 1240. See id. at 1265; Middleton, supra
note 34, at 192. But see id at 1214 n.32.
m' Watson, 108 S Ct. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[TIhe plurality, of course, is correct
that the initial burden of proof is borne by the plaintiff, who must establish, by some form of numerical
showing, that a facially neutral hiring practice select[s] applicants ... in a significantly discriminatory
pattern."); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S 329; 46 F.R.D. at 214-15; MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS, supra
note 19, at 34; Smith, supra, note 41, at 387. Cf Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2789 ("Nor are courts or
defendants obliged to assume that plaintiff's statistical evidence is reliable").
"3 United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716-17.
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iary principles concerning the facts that raise presumptions0 4
To make a prima facie showing of a Title VII violation, the Supreme
Court has stated generally that evidence must be presented establishing
actions by the defendant which, absent explanation, would normally be
thought to be based on discriminatory criteria?05 In many circumstances,
statistical evidence showing disparities in the representation or selec-
tion rates of racial, ethnic, or gender groups may be sufficient to establish
such a prima facie case. The Court's previous discussion of the use of
statistics reflects the acceptability of disparate impact and statistical im-
balances as evidence from which logically to infer and to presume"6
discriminatory intent.
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in
a case such as this one only because such imbalance is often
a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation,
it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring
practices will in time result in a work force more or less
representative in the community from which employees are
hired. Evidence of long lasting and gross disparity between the
composition of a work force and that of the general population
thus may be significant even though Section 703(j) makes clear
that Title VII imposes no requirement that a work force mir-
ror the general population
0 7
204 The specific denial of an element of the basic facts of a prima facie case by the defending
party, and the introduction of evidence in support of that denial, does not shift the burden of per-
suasion to the party defending. JONES ON EVIDENCE, supra note 49, § 5:2, at 525-26.
205 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54. ("The prima facie case serves an important function in litiga-
tion: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection") See
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 358 & n.44; Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters,
438 U.& at 575-76; Laughlin, supra note 200, at 211-12. Cf 46 F.R.D. 161, 212-13, 214-15 (1969).
2w There is some precedent in criminal matters for the contention that the Constitution requires
that the basic fact of presumption (civil or criminal) must permit an inference of the presumed fact.
10 MOORE'S, supra note 68, 1 301.06, at 111-26. See Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Henderson, 279
U.S. 639 (1929).
5a7Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (disparate treatment) (cited by Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2121
n.6.) See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S 229, 242 (1976) ("an invidious discriminatory purpose
may often be inferred from the totality of relevant facts .... It is also not infrequently there that
the discriminatory impact may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because
in various circumstances the discrimination is difficult to explain on non-racial grounds."). But cf
Griggs' Folly, supra note 12, at 439-45.
Nevertheless, statistical proportionality is not assumed to be the norm. As Justice O'Connor
states without ambiguity, "[ilt is completely unrealistic to assume that unlawful discrimination
is the sole cause of people failing to gravitate to jobs and employers in accord with the laws of chance.
... It would be equally unrealistic to suppose that employers can eliminate, or discover and ex-
plain, the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of
their work forces." Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. at 2787 (O'Connor, J.); id. at 2797
(Stevens, J., concurring). Cf Cox, supra note 12, at 762-63.
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Disparate impact, as with disparate treatment, has as its function the
"allocation of burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establish-
ment of a prima facie case... intended progressively to sharpen the in-
quiry into the illusive factual question of intentional discrimination " '208
Evidence establishing a disparate impact is thus the functional equivalent
for a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent in making a prima
facie showing of an unlawful employment practice 9 Such a purpose does
not demand a difficult trigger, and is effectuated by an easy one?10
In Watson, the Court allowed a prima facie case of disparate impact
to be made using the statistical imbalance caused by subjective selec-
tion procedures?11 The Court thereby further conformed the allocation
and order of proof in this aspect of disparate impact litigation to McDon-
nell Douglas. Justice Blackmun does not object to this particular mimicry,
and, indeed, concurs?
12
Watson also departs significantly in one respect from the position
perhaps accepted by the dissenters and clearly expressed in the 1978
Uniform Guidelines. Sections 3A and 4D define adverse (or disparate)
impact strictly in terms of a four-fifths disparity in the selection rate of
actual applicants resulting from the use "tests and other selection pro-
cedures' 213 However, the Court had never limited the use of statistics
to the selection rate14 and Watson explicitly overruled the four-fifths rule
Burdine, 450 U.S at 255 n.8. See also Bakke, 438 U.S at 308 n.44 (1978) (Powell, J.) ("[Tihe
presumption in Griggs [is] that disparate impact without any showing of business justification
established the existence of discrimination in violation of the statute")
'Cf Watson, 108 S Ct. at 2785. The "functional equivalence" theory holds that neutral criteria
that have an adverse impact on protected classes and do not serve any legitimate business purpose
are the functional equivalents of race, and therefore should be treated like race- Willbern, supra
note 37, at 804, 812-14.
'
10 See Senate Hearing supra note 61, at 196-97 (Testimony of Richard A. Keatinge); Furnish,
supra note 9, at 435-36. Indeed, the easing of the plaintiffs burden in making a prima facie case
of disparate impact effectuated by Watson, argues for the easing of the defendant's burden on rebut-
tal. See ScHLEi & GaOssMAN, supra note 10, at 1328 n.139. Cf Furnish, supra note 9, at 436; Holdeman,
Changing Face supra note 34, at 181.
*11 In part, the Court was motivated in this decision to address "subconscious stereotypes and
prejudices," Watson, 108 S Ct. at 2786, and in part because it questioned whether "discriminatory
intent... can be adequately policed through disparate treatment analyses." Id. at 2786. Cf Cox,
supra note 12, at 776-77; cf generally Rutherglen, supra note 14.
... Watson, 108 S Ct. at 2792 (Blackmun, J.) See id at 2797 (Stevens, J.)
'13 See Uniform Guidelines, supra note 15, § 2B, at 38297. See also Questions 5 and 6, Adoption
of Questions and Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 11996, 11997 (1979) [hereinafter Questions].
... The Court in Dothard stated: "tihere is no requirement... that a statistical showing of
disproportionate impact must always be based on analysis of the characteristics of actual applicants.'
433 U.S at 330. See also New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S at 584-87 (1979). Cf
Teamsters, 431 U.S at 340 n.20 ("general population"); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S at 308 ("relevant labor market"), cited in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S Ct.
at 2135 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf Booth & Mackay, supra note 34, at 143.
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in favor of a case-by-case approach?1
Thus, both Watson's unanimous holding on subjective procedures and
its plurality holding on the four-fifths rule, not only facilitate the establish-
ment of a prima facie case, but also require only a little more - if any
- than the proof necessary to raise an inference of intentional discrimina-
tion under statistical disparate treatment cases?16
On the other hand, Atonio perhaps illuminates a surviving distinc-
tion between a disparate impact case and a statistical disparate treat-
ment case. The Court held that comparisons between different employee
groups within the same firm where one group is not chosen from the other,
ie, neither a selection nor a representation rate, is "nonsensical '21 7 and
"irrelevant' 2 1  Additionally, the Court in Atonio required that there not
only be a disparity in selection or representation rates, but that this
disparity be causally connected to a particular and specific selection prac-
tice or criterion?1 " Under a statistical disparate treatment case, neither
restriction is observed, and any imbalance disclosed by the employment
population - provided it is sufficiently large not to be the result of mere
chance - is admitted. Both of Atonio's requirements are irrelevant if a
disproportion alone is the essence of the disparate impact case, but highly
relevant if a well disguised discriminatory intent is the target of the prima
facie case?2 0 The distinction recognizes the difference between the mis-
sions of the two analyses: the statistical disparate treatment case seeks
to uncover the manipulation of a variety of criteria and procedures to
accomplish a discriminatory goal, while the disparate impact case focuses
on the use of one particular criterion or procedure for the same purpose.
215 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2789 n.3 ("At least at this stage of the law's development, we believe
that such a case-by-case approach properly reflects our recognition that statistics come in infinite
variety and.., their usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances."); id
at 2792 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See Teamsters, 431 U. S. at 340. Cf Griggs' Folly, supra note
12, at 446-51.
... See Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2121 (citing Teamsters and Hazelwood); cf Teamsters, 431 U.S. at
337-43; Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. at 307-13; id. at 347-49 (White, J., concur-
ring in Hazelwood (disparate treatment) and dissenting in Dothard (disparate impact) but applying
the same reasoning in both cases); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S at 487-92; Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. at 629-31. But see Rutherglen, supra note 14, at 1332; Middleton, supra note 34, at 203.
:1 Atonio, 109 S Ct. at 2122.
21" Id. at 2123; see Uniform Guidelines, supra note 15, § 3A, 4, at 38297; Questions 9-27, supra
note 213, 44 F. Reg. at 11997-12000.
219 Atonio, 109 S Ct. at 2124-25; Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788-90; id. at 2792 n.1 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part). Cf Uniform Guidelines, supra note 15, § 4C.
22 Rutherglen, supra note 14, passim; Cox, supra note 12, at 757-58, 772-78; cf Atonio, 109 S.
Ct. at 2124-25. In this sense, the definition of disparate impact propounded by the Uniform Guidelines
- a strict selection rate - may support the latter concept of disparate impact's target.
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While disparate impact is established by a different kind of statistical
imbalance than disparate treatment, the underlying concept of the
significance, relevance and logical strength of such statistics as support-
ing an inference of intentional discrimination is presupposed, perhaps
with some confusion, by all members of the Court. Justice Stevens states
that "evidence of a racially stratified work force" has "probative value'
221
A fact cannot be merely probative of itself, but must be probative of some
other fact. The use of the term suggests that this imbalance points toward
something other than itself, toward something other than a mere
statistical imbalance or disproportion. Unless one imbalance is evidence
of another, mathematically unrelated, more legally relevant imbalance,
this "other fact" may well be intentional discrimination, for which
statistical imbalances and disparate impact are a "functional equivalent".
This "probative value" is explicitly utilized in a statistical disparate treat-
ment case. In disparate impact, Justice Stevens cites two disparate treat-
ment cases, Hazelwood and Teamsters, as authority providing the stand-
ard for proper statistical evidence 22 and refers to such statistics as suf-
ficing "to establish a prima facie case of discrimination ' 223 - a com-
mingling of disparate impact and disparate treatment concepts to which
he objects when done by the Court 24
In defining the character of a disparate impact case, the members
of the Court have struggled with an elaborate judicially created construct
that imposed a substantial difference in analysis and consequence be-
tween the similar basic facts and similar justification of a statistical
disparate treatment case and a disparate impact case. The logic of Rule
301 has allowed the majority in Atonio to rationalize this anomaly, to
simplify pertinent legal analysis, to facilitate the plaintiffs initial burden,
and to attach similar consequences to similar circumstances.
C. Second Stage's Evidence
Under the dissenters' view, as noted by Justice Blackmun, "the
disparate impact caused by an employment practice is directly established
by the numerical disparity," which is then negated by establishing "a
manifest relationship to the employment in question."221 It is difficult
' Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 2134-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
-- ' Id. at 2135 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Teamster,% 431 U.S at 335 n.15; Middleton, supra
note 34, at 202.
E.g, id. n.29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S Ct. at 2794 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also
Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at (Stevens, J., dissenting). The purpose of Title VII thus becomes the maximum
feasible racial and gender balance, not the elimination of invidious discrimination. But see Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1803-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("While the prima facie
case under McDonnell Douglas and the statistical showing of imbalance involved in an impact case
may both be indicators of discrimination or its 'functional equivalent,' they are not, in and of
themselves, the evils Congress sought to eradicate from the employment setting.") Cf infra note 235.
Fall, 1989]
49
Beard: Title VII, Rule 301, and Atonio
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1990
to fit this view of the disparate impact showing into any theory of presump-
tions, Morgan, Thayer, or other.2 6 Evidence of job relatedness, or even
the most persuasive kind of business necessity, does not "meet," "rebut,"
or "contradict" this disparity. It is logically unrelated to the statistics.
Only evidence attacking the statistics, ie, showing their lack of reliability
or lack of connection to the selection procedure at issue, would "meet"
the disparity.
On the other hand, if disparate impact is directed toward
"discriminatory" practices and the "functional equivalent" of discrimina-
tion,2 7 then rebuttal evidence of a non-statistical nature is relevant
because such evidence contradicts the inference of intentional discrimina-
tion or other invidious purpose. Applying the logic of Rule 301 to the sec-
ond stage of Title VII litigation would require that the presumption raised
by the prima facie case be rebutted by any affir-mative evidence from which
a non-discriminatory motive or purpose may be inferred. Such evidence
would be "evidence to rebut or meet the presumption,"2 8 or "evidence
contradicting the presumed fact.'" As the Court noted in Teamsters, "[t]he
employer's defense must, of course, be designed to meet the prima facie
case of the Government."2 30 This evidence does not have to be in fact be-
lieved by the court, and evidence refuting the defendant's assertions are
not properly considered at this stage. Thus, evidence that the proffered
motive was not the defendant's actual motive would not undermine or
negate the rebuttal, but would rather support a finding at the third stage
that the defendant's proffered motive was in fact a pretext or coverup for
intentional discrimination?3
The propriety of this broad spectrum of evidence was not recognized
by Watson, though Justice Blackmun seems to think it was?32 Nor was
I As noted previously, Justice Stevens no longer even tries. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2130, 2131
("affirmative defense.")
See id. at 2121 & n.6; Rutherglen, supra note 14, passim; Cox, supra note 12, passim.
"' FED. R. Evm. 301.
,'CoNT. Comm. REPORT, supra note 83, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADliIN. NEWS at 7099. See also
Draft Rules of Evidence, supra note 21, 46 F.R.D. at 212 ("Evidence ... contrary to the existence
of the presumed fact"); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 704 ("evidence ... which would support
a finding of [the] non-existence [of the presumed fact]."); THAYER, supra note 19, at 336; WEiNSTEIN,
supra note 49, 301[02], at 301-32 to 301-33 & n.14; 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5125,
at 601-02 ("evidence which is contrary to the presumed fact.") Cf Ladd, supra note 49, at 283-85.
', International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S at 360 n.46. Cf Greer v. United
States, 245 U.S at 561 (basic fact must allow a logical inference of presumed fact); Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Ca, 428 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1975); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Belton, supra
note 11, at 1218-19, 1222; Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 49, at 529. See generally Note, Constitutionality,
supra note 160. But see Allen, Anatomy, supra note 84, at 898; Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 49, at
532-33.
See text infra at 162-63.
' Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. at 2794 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See generally
Holdeman, Changing Face supra note 34, at 193-94.
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it accepted in Atonio.2 The Court still appears to maintain the possibility
that a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason unrelated to the defendant's
business would not be sufficient to rebut a disparate impact prima facie
casem This would appear to conflict with pronouncements by members
of the Court that Title VII prohibits only employment decisions caused
by the prohibited criteria (race, color, national origin, religion, or sex)
and leave the employer free to make such decisions on any other criteria
whatsoever. s
However, if Justice Blackmun's reasoning is accurate, Justice O'Con-
nor's decision - consistent with Rule 301 - leads to the use of any specific
non-discriminatory reason for rebuttal?"ss
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S Ct. at 2125-26.
Id. ("serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer."); Watson,
108 S Ct. at 2790 (O'Connor, J.) ("legitimate business reason"). See Middleton, supra note 34, at
231. For example, assume that a named plaintiff establishes a prima facie disparate impact case
by showing that the defendant preferentially hires members of his own extended family. The defen-
dant responds not that family ties generate more efficient workers, but that they needed jobs and,
if unemployed, he would be morally obligated to support them. Assume further that there is no
evidence of pretext, eg, of inconsistent use of family ties to the disadvantage of protected groups,
or of a similar nature. This situation, though unlikely, arguably would not be a "legitimate business
purpose," Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297, 1303 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467
U. 1251 (1984), but would meet Rule 301 standards for rebuttal and might well attract five members
of the Supreme Court. Similarly, an employer might exclude a bankrupt from employment because
he would create additional administrative burdens unrelated to his actual job performance. Fur-
nish, supra note 9, at 442. Analogous voluntary preferences might be based on military service,
community activism, or astrological signs. See eg, Garcia v. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156, 162 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert denied, 449 U.S 1113 (1981). But cf § 712 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
2000e-10) (preserving veterans' preference).
2 The legislative history of Title VII found pertinent by Justice Brennan and noted in Hopkins
is equally pertinent here: "[tihe converse, therefore, of 'for cause' legislation, Title VII eliminates
certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving employer's freedom
of choice." In support of this assertion, Justice Brennan notes
Congress specifically declined to require that an employment decision have been 'for
cause' in order to escape affirmative penalty (such as reinstatement or backpay) from
a court. As introduced in the House, the bill that became Title VII forbade such affirm-
ative relief if an 'individual was ... refused employment or advancement, or was
suspended or discharged for cause" H.R. 7152,88th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1963) (emphasis
added [by Justice Brennan]). The phrase 'for cause' eventually was deleted in favor of
the phrase 'for any reason other than' one of the enumerated characteristics. See 110
Cong.Rec. 2567-2571 (1964). Representative Celler explained that this substitution
'speciffied] cause'; in his view, a court 'cannot find any violation of the act which is
based on facts other ... than discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion,
or national origin? Id, at 2567.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S Ct. at 1784-85 & n.4 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
JJ.) See also 110 Cong. Rec. 6549 (1964) (Remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("any reason, good or bad").
Cf Comment, Business Necessity Defense supra note 12, at 926-28; Rothschild & Werden, Title VII
and the Use of Employment Tests: An Illustration of the Limits of the Judicial Process, 11 J. LEGAL
STuD. 262, 262, 266-68 (1982) [hereinafter Rothschild & Werden]. But cf Cox, supra note 12, at 759,
769, 777-78, 783-84, 794-97 (Under the dissenters' view of disparate impact, Title VII regulates the
concept of individual "merit".)
'w See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 ("legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason"). As discussed supra at 135-38, a mere denial of discriminatory motive will
not suffice, and the employer must proffer evidence of a specific purpose.
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Nevertheless, Watson and Atonio, under any construction, substan-
tially reduce, though perhaps do not eliminate, the difference between
the rebuttal evidence for disparate treatment and that for disparate im-
pact. In Watson, Justice O'Connor states:
A second constraint on the application of disparate impact
theory lies in the nature of the "business necessity" or "job
relatedness" defense. Although we have said that an employer
has "the burden of showing that any given requirement must
have a manifest relationship to the employment in question,"
Griggs, 401 U. S., at 432, such a formulation should not be in-
terpreted as implying that the ultimate burden of proof can be
shifted to the defendant. Thus . .. the defendant has met its
burden [by] producing evidence that its employment practices
are based on legitimate business reasons ....
Our cases make it clear that employers are not required,
even when defending standardized or objective tests, to introduce
formal "validation studies" showing that particular criteria
predict actual on-the-job performance. 37
Justice White in Atonio, takes a similar approach:
Though we have phrased the query differently in different cases,
it is generally well-established that at the justification stage
of such a disparate impact case, the dispositive issue is whether
a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate
employment goals of the employer. See, eg, [Watson]; New York
Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S., at 587, n. 31 ... ; Griggs
v. Duke Power Ca, 401 U.S., at 432.... The touchstone of this
inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer's justification for
his use of the challenged practice A mere insubstantial justifica-
tion in this regard will not suffice, because such a low standard
of review would permit discrimination to be practiced through
the use of spurious, seemingly neutral employment practice. At
the same time, though, there is no requirement that the
challenged practice be "essential" or "indispensable" to the
employer's business for it to pass muster: this degree of scrutiny
would be almost impossible for most employers to meet, and
u Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. at 2790 (O'Connor, J.). As recognized by Pro-
fessor Hartigan and Ms. Wigdor, general aptitude tests have now been substantially validated con-
sistent with the Uniform Guidelines through the technique of "validity generalization" for the 12,000
or more job categories covered by the United States Employment Service, if not all job categories
within the American economy. FAIRNEss IN TESTING, supra note 34, at 119-88.
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would result in a host of evils we have identified above? s
Examining the logical implications of Justice O'Connor's position, Justice
Blackmun disagreed:
Intertwined with the plurality's suggestion that the defendant's
burden of establishing business necessity is merely one of pro-
duction is the implication that the defendant may satisfy this
burden simply by "producing evidence that its employment prac-
tices are based on legitimate business reasons." Ante, at 2790.
Again, the echo from the disparate-treatment cases is un-
mistakable .... An employer accused of discriminating inten-
tionally need only dispute that it had any such intent - which
it can do by offering any legitimate, nondiscriminatory justifica-
tion?39
Justice Blackmun's description of the minimum evidence on rebuttal con-
trasts sharply with that of the plurality. He states:
Precisely what constitutes a business necessity cannot be re-
duced, of course, to a scientific formula, for it necessarily in-
volves a case-specific judgment which must take into account
the nature of the particular business and job in question. The
term itself, however, goes a long way toward establishing the
limits of the defense: To be justified as a business necessity an
employment criterion must bear more than an indirect or
minimal relationship to job performance .... The criterion must
directly relate to a prospective employee's ability to perform the
job effectively .... In sum, under Griggs and its progeny, an
employer, no matter how well intended, will be liable under Title
VII if it relies upon an employment-selection process that disad-
vantages a protected class, unless that process is shown to be
Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26. Hartigan and Wigdor argue that where an employment pro-
cedure has been validly established to provide only moderate and imperfect prediction of future
job success (such as the General Aptitude Test Battery developed by the United States Employment
Service), and where the procedure results in disparate impact on racial minorities, racial preferences
should be used to correct the disparate impact and provide an equal proportion (by race) of the rele-
vant employment opportunities. FAImNESS n TESTING, supra note 3r, at 283-84. However, even the
moderate and imperfect predictability of a selection procedure would not be a "spurious, seemingly
neutral, employment practice,' and thus not a "mere insubstantial justification" Cf Booth & Mackay,
supra note 34, at 169-70. Hence, the racial preferences advocated by Hartigan and Wigdor would
be unlawful under Title VII if they were imposed on employers.
' Watson, 108 S Ct. at 2794 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The similarity, if not the identity, of
the rebuttal evidence in both disparate treatment and disparate impact cases is perhaps epitomized
by Justice O'Connor's characterization of the employer's burden in a treatment case as "sufficient
business reasons." Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Cf Furnco Const. Co. v.
Waters, 438 U.S at 577; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S at 801; Furnish, supra
note 9, at 437.
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necessary to fulfill legitimate business requirements 40
The Court's prior cases have not unequivocally supported business
necessity as described by Justice Blackmun,241 nor validation as the sole
means of showing such necessity,242 though some lower court opinions do
support both contentions2 43 Griggs and Teal used the ambiguous term
Watson, 108 S, Ct. at 2794-95 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See Atonio, 109 S Ct. at 2132 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). See also Hopkins, 109 S Ct. at 1786 (Brennan, J.) ("emphasis on 'business necessity'
in disparate impact cases"). Cf also S. 1261, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. S7513 (daily
ed. June 23, 1989) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) ("essential to effective job performance"). But
see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The simple truth
is that pre-employment tests, like most attempts to predict the future, will never be completely ac-
curate. We should bear in mind that pre-employment testing, so long as it is fairly related to the
job skills or work characteristics desired, possesses the potential of being an effective weapon in
protecting equal employment opportunity because it has a unique capacity to measure all applicants
objectively on a standardized basis.")
" To the contrary, in Hopkins, the plurality reflects that "[Title VII] does not purport to limit
the other qualities and characteristics that employers may take into account in making employ-
ment decisions.' Hopkins, 109 SCt. at 1784 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.); id,
at 1787 (" 'Any other criterion or qualification for employment is not affected by this title. 110 Cong.
Rec. 7213 (1964).") See also Aguilera v. Cook County Police and Corrections Merit Bd., 760 F.2d
844, 846-47 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.), cert. denied, 474 U.S 907 (1985) (Supreme Court formulations
are not as stringent as they might seem); Smith, supra note 41, at 396-99; Middleton, supra note
34, at 232.
241 Significantly Justice Blackmun in Watson concedes that formal validation is, at least, not
always necessary. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2795. Cf General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42
(1976); Alberti, supra note 114, at 197; Booth & Mackay, supra note 34, at 127, 137-38 (1970 Guidelines
not endorsed by Griggs.) See generally SCHLEI & GROSsMAN, supra note 10, at 94-95 & nn. 46-49;
id. at 22 (1987 Supp.).
143 See eg, Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421
U.S. 910 (1974); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc, 633 F.2d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 1980);. cert denied,
450 U.S. 965 (1981); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1389 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 968 (1979); James v. Stockham Valve & Fitting Co., 559 F.2d 310, 344
(5th Cir. 1977); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973); Rowe v. Cleveland
Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982); Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 523 F.2d 1290,
1298 (8th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 331-32 (8th Cir. 1986); Wambheim
v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S 1255 (1984); Williams
v. Colorado Springs School Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981); Crawford v. Western
Electric Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 1373, 1385 (11th Cir. 1985); Kinsey v. First Regional Securities, Inc.,
557 F.2d 830, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also 29 C.F.R. 1606.7 (b & c) ("business necessity"). See Fur.
nish, supra note 9, at 426; Maltz, supra note 34, at 349. See generally Booth & Mackay, supra note
34, at 128-29, Comment, Business Necessity Defense, supra note 12, at 918-920, 933-934.
But see eg, Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1981), aft'd on other grounds, 457 U.S.
440 (1982); NAACP v. Medical Center, 657 F.2d 1332 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Title VI case discuss-
ing Title VII standards); Coker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc); Walls v. Mississippi
State Dep't. of Pub. Welfare, 730 F.2d 306, 316-317 (5th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Olin Chem. Corp., 555
F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc); EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1988);
Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1981); Aguilera v. Cook County
Policy Corrections Merit Bd., 760 F.2d 844, 846-477 (7th Cir. 1985); Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford
Co., 562 F.2d 496, 498-500 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978); Washington v. Kroger,
671 F.2d 1072, 1077 (8th Cir. 1982). See Smith, supra note 41, at 400-401.
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term "manifest relationship to the employment" 244 and Griggs implies
that employment tests must only be "[rielated to measuring job
capability '245 and "demonstrably a reasonable measure of job perfor-
mance."2'2 Beazer suggests an arguably more flexible standard of "signifi-
cant service" to business goals? 4 7 In Albemarle, the Court expounded the
standard as being "job related,"24 and declined to use or endorse the
Fourth Circuit's language below, based on Lorillard,49 probably the
quintessential discussion of the dissenters' view of the second stage?
50
Dicta in both United States v. South Carolina251 and in Washington u
Davis252 would require only that the criterion be related to performance
But see also Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972) (degree of validity
or relationship to business purpose required for particular job is inversely dependent on degree of
risk to public).
Some analyses suggest that there were in fact two criteria, a "business necessity" standard for
employment practices and a "job related" standard for written employment tests. E.g Note Title
VII and Competitive Testing, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 299, 307-09 (1987). Cf Note, Judicial Dualism,
supra note 9, at 387-91, 401-03.
" Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S at 432; Connecticut v. Teal, 457 US. at 446. Cf Chamallas,
supra note 30, at 343-44. Indeed, the Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas characterizes the selection
procedure forbidden in Griggs as those devices that overstate "what is necessary for competent per-
formance.., or [are] unrelated to [the] applicant's personal qualification as an employee." McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 806, quoted in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.
Ct. at 2129 n.ll (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf Furnish, supra note 9, at 426; Rutherglen, supra note
14, at 1313; Note, Judicial Dualism, supra note 9, at 386-87 (Griggs "susceptible to highly divergent
interpretations limited only by the particular court's perspective of Title VII"); id. at 401-03; Com-
ment, Business Necessity Defense supra note 12, at 929-30.
" Griggs, 401 U.S at 432.
"4 Id. at 436. Cf Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 521 n.5 (5th Cir. 1978);
SCHLEI & GRossmAN, supra note 10, at 112-13; Furnish, supra note 9, at 426-27.
"' 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979); id at 602 (White, J., dissenting) ("some relationship to the
employment"). See Belton, supra note 11, at 1246; Furnish, supra note 9, at 429-32; Comment,
Business Necessity Defense supra note 12, at 918; Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate Ef
fects Standard of Liability in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 555,597-600 (1985); Middleton,
supra note 34, at 199-200, 238.
US 422 U.S. at 425.
-9 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971) ("there [must exist] an overriding legitimate business pur-
pose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus,
the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged
practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be
no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose
advanced, or accomplished it equally well with a lesser differential impact.' Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 474 F.2d 134, 138 n.2 (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.),
cert dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971)). See Booth & Mackay, supra note 34, at 132; but see Caldwell,
supra note 247, at 594-95.
15 Belton, supra note 11, at 1232-33 n.114; Furnish, supra note 9, at 429 n.89; Maltz, supra
note 34, at 349; Comment, Business Necessity Defense supra note 12, at 918-19 & n.46.
"' 434 U.S. at 1026 (1978). See id at 1026-28 (White, J., dissenting). Cf Booth & Mackay, supra
note 34, at 138.
2 426 U.S. 229, 248-52; id. at 256 (Stevens, J., concurring). See Booth & Mackay, supra note
34, at 136; Maltz, supra note 34, at 350.
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23in a job training program. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, one of the issues
before the court was the nature of the rebuttal proof offered to a prima
facie case. In contrast to Justice Blackmun's demand in Watson for
business necessity, the Court required that the evidence must only per-
mit an inference of job-relatedness, Le, relevance.
If the job-related quality that the appellants identify is bona
fide, their purpose could be achieved by adopting and validating
a test for applicants that measures strength directly. Such a
test fairly administered, would fully satisfy the standards of
Title VII because it would be one that measure[s] the person
for the job and not the person in the abstract. Griggs v. Duke
Power Ca .... But nothing in the present record even approaches
such a measurement 25
A footnote referred to the EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Pro-
cedures, 255 Washington u Davi; Albemarle, and Officers for Justice U Civil
Service Commission? This suggests strongly that a test that was not
formally validated - but that actually measured the needed quality -
could show job-relatedness even if the requirements for the then-operative
1976 EEOC Guidelines were not fully met. Griggs McDonnell Douglas,
and Burdine all had required only a certain minimum of rebuttal evidence,
which was not presented by the State of Alabama: "In the district court,
however, the appellants produced no evidence correlating the . . . re-
quirements with requisite[s] thought essential to a good job performance.
Indeed, they fail[ed] to offer evidence of any kind in specific justification
of the . . . standards.' '2 57
In any event, the degree of disparate impact or statistical imbalance
does not affect the relevance of evidence of legitimate business purpose?"8
"Congress has specifically provided that employers are not required to
avoid 'disparate impact' as such ... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)." 25" However,
433 U.S, 321 (1977).
3' Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S, at 332 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). But see id. at
331-32 & n.14 ("necessary to safe and efficient job performance,' "essential to good job performance").
Cf Furnish, supra note 9, at 427-28.
255 29 C.F.R. Part 1607 (1976).
15 395 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Calif. 1975) (preliminary injunction). See id. at 380-81 (height require-
ment supported by no relevant evidence); id, at 384-85 (physical agility requirement not correlated
with performance ratings).
257 Dothard, 433 U.S at 331.
1 Rutherglen, supra note 14, at 1326; but see id at 1320-29; Willborn, supra note 37, at 822-26;
Note, Judicial Dualism, supra note 9, at 395-96; ScHLEi & GROssMAN, supra note 10, at 170; No-
Alternative Approach, supra note 34, at 101.
' Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. at 2787. See id. at 2797 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). Cf Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567. But see Watson, 108 S Ct. at 2793, 2794-95
(Blackmun J., concurring); Uniform Guidelines, supra note 15, § 3B, at 38297.
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a high disparate impact may be relevant to the question at stage three
of whether the procedure has been used as a pretext for discrimination 60
Thus, the Court narrowed substantially the difference between the
nature of the defendant employer's rebuttal burden at the second stage
in disparate impact and disparate treatment. But while the former has
approached the latter, but has not yet converged, the logic of Rule 301
should ultimately prevail.
D. Third Stage's Ultimate Issue
At the third stage, the issue is the existence of intentional discrimina-
tion as the motivation for the employment decision. 61 This is the
unanimous teaching of all Supreme Court disparate impact cases from
Albemarle until Watson; it is the teaching of Rule 301 and Burdine; and
it is the logical ramification of "functional equivalence" as that concept
is shaped by the discussion in Watson and Atonio.
The contrary view has taught that after a defendant has met its
burden in response to a showing of disparate impact, the plaintiff may
prevail by making one of a variety of showings. 62s Justice Stevens has
'" Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2126-27. Cf Schnapper, Two Categories of
Discriminatory Intent, 17 HAlv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31 (1982); Willborn, supra note 37, at 825-26.
"I Discriminatory intent is the same for Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Cf International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S at 335-37 & n.15;
New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587; Schnapper, supra note 260, at 58.
' This view of the third stage of Title VII litigation is not confined by its proponents to disparate
impact cases alone. Two members of the Court have attempted to apply it to recent disparate treat-
ment cases.
In Hopkins, Justice Brennan noted that "[ilf the plaintiff fails to satisfy the factfinder that it
is more likely than not that a forbidden characteristic [ia intentional discrimination] played a part
in the employment decision, then she may prevail only if she proves, following Burdine, that the
employer's stated reason for its decision is pretextual." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at
1789 n.12. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 17, Hopkins ("if the defendant's evidence
raises a genuine issue of fact, then the plaintiff must introduce evidence tending to show either
that the defendant's explanation 'is unworthy of credence,' or that 'a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer' (Burdine, 450 U.S at 256) [sic]") Justice Brennan's view is contradicted
by the legislative history that he found pertinent and persuasive in the same case, supra at note
235. See also infra note 311.
In Aikens, Justice Blackmun, concurring, implied that the "ultimate burden" in disparate treat-
ment can be something other than intentional discrimination. Joined here only by Justice Bren-
nan, he states that "the McDonnell Douglas framework requires that a plaintiff prevail when at
the third stage of a Title VII trial he demonstrates the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason given
by the employer is in fact not the true reason for the employment decision" United States Postal
Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S at 718. Such true reason, however, need not necessarily
be a "pretext for discrimination" McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 804-05, or as a
"coverup for a racially discriminatory decision" id, but merely another, possibly less easily articulated
- but none the less nondiscriminatory - motivation, and the court need not necessarily find that
the employer was in fact motivated by intentional discrimination.
Thus Justices Brennan and Blackmun, and perhaps Justices Marshall and Stevens, believed
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has now abandoned the third stage, not mentioning it even in passing
in his dissent in Atonio, and recognizing perhaps that the third stage is
inconsistent with the imposition of the burden of persuasion on the
employer at the second stage?2 However, in light of Atonio's majority, the
third stage undoubtedly will be the last bastion of the orthodox view.264
One of these prevailing showings at the third stage, of course, is that
the use of the selection procedure was merely a pretext or coverup for
discrimination and that the employer was actually motivated, at least
in part, by discriminatory intent?65 However, the dissenters' argument
claims that other showings are equally effective for the plaintiff to prevail.
The first of these is that there are alternative selection procedures with
equal effectiveness in advancing the employer's articulated business pur-
pose that would have had less disparate impact? A second possible show-
ing is that the procedure does not in fact advance the employer's ar-
ticulated business purpose6 7 A third is that the articulated business
that the plaintiff may prevail in a disparate treatment case even though the court has specifically
found that intentional discrimination did not play a part - solely, substantially, supportively, or
even a walk-on role - in the employment decision. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1789 n.12. But see id
at 1783 (Brennan, J.) ("fabricated its complaints about Hopkins' interpersonal skills as a pretext
for discrimination"). Justice O'Connor apparently disavows this interpretation of pretext, Hopkins,
109 S. Ct. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Nor have we confined the word 'pretext' to the nar-
row definition which the plurality attempts to pin on it today. See ante, at 1788-89 ") Justice White
has not signed on either, Hopkins, 109 & Ct. at 1795-96 (White, J., concurring); Player, supra note
116, at 28 n.36.
282 See text supra at 148-49; Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. at
24 n.1; Belton, supra note 11, at 1212, 1273-74; see also Furnish, supra note 9, at 436. Cf Lamber,
supra note 109, at 12-13; S. 2104 § 4, supra note 120.
214 Cf Rothschild & Werden, supra note 235, at 273 (third stage rarely if ever reached); SCHLEI
& GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 82, 156-57 (scored tests rarely shown to be used for discriminatory
purpose); Holdeman, Changing Face supra note 34, at 181. But see § 4, S. 2104.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S at 436; Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S at 447; Brief
of Amicus Curiae the United States at 29 n.37, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atono; Tidwell v. American
Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1971).
'28 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. at 2795 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Brief of
Amicus Curiae the United States at 14, 15, 28-29, Atonio; SCHLEI & GRossLAN, supra note 10, at
92, 1325. The Uniform Guidelines, supra note 15, additionally required the defendant to prove the
absence of such alternative means. § § 3B; 15B(9); 15C(6); 15D(8). Cf 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1976); Booth
& Mackay, supra note 34, at 190; Alberti, supra note 114, at 197, 202, 205-07 & n.147; Caldwell,
supra note 247, at 602; Lamber, supra note 109, at 44-45 & n.168. So did a number of lower federal
courts, eg, Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d at 798-800. See generally Furnish, supra note 9,
at 423 n.34; Player, supra note 116, at 35 n.52; Note, Judicial Dualism, supra note 9, at 397-400.
But see Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425; Teal, 457 U.S at 447; New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. at 587; Furnish, supra note 9, at 425; Griggs'Folly, supra note 12, at 463-64; Maltz, supra
note 34, at 351; Player, supra note 116, at 35 n.52. Cf Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578; Alberti, supra note
114, at 203.
,87 Watson, 108 S Ct. at 2796 n.6 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Brief of Amicus Curiae the United
States at 15, 27-28, Atonio. The Uniform Guidelines, by requiring the employer-defendant to under-
take highly formal validity studies, as a practical matter also placed the burden of persuasion of
this element on the defendant.
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purpose is not in fact the actual motivation for the employer's decision
to use the selection process at issue, though the motivation is not shown
to be an intent to discriminate?" There may well be others? 9 Any one
of these showings purportedly negates the defendant's showing and wins
the case for the plaintiff?7
The dissenter's view has been caused at least in part by a implicit
interpretation of the term "pretext" as it has been used by the Supreme
Court in describing the issue before the court - and thus the plaintiff's
burden - at the "third stage" of Title VII litigation. It suggests that
"pretext" can mean something other than that the proffered reason was
a "mere pretext for discrimination." This interpretation is not based on
Griggs because Griggs does not discuss or even allude to the third stage?71
However, pretext is logically, grammatically, and legally part of a
prepositional phrase: a proffered motive is shown to be a "pretext for"
a concealed motive 72 The means other than "pretext for discrimination"
that are advanced to negate an employer's showing are in fact means
by which "pretext" itself may be established. Each is indirect and cir-
cumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination that encourages -
but does not compel - an inference that the defendant was in fact
motivated by a discriminatory purpose?7
1. Between Albemarle and Watson
The Court in Albemarle provides the most explicit support for the
need to establish intentional discrimination at the third stage?1 4 There
I'- Cf United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 718 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) (disparate treatment). The apparent justification for this view is that, if the plaintiff can
show that the defendant's proffered explanation is not accurate, he should be left, at the very least,
in the same position he would have been in had his prima facie case not been rebutted in the first
place Cf Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 13, Harbison-Walker Refractories v. Brieck,
109 S Ct. 546-47 (1988) (writ dismissed as improvidently granted); Player, supra note 116, at 30 n.39.
Mendez, supra note 184, at 1154 n.128.
270 The last three showings are primarily relevant only to a showing that the defendant employer
was not in fact motivated or using the selection procedure to advance the articulated business pur-
pose. However, the credibility of the rebuttal evidence, even if totally destroyed, cannot revive the
prima facie case to any degree whatsoever. See infra note 282. But see 1 LoutsELL & MuELLER, supra
note 63, § 68, at 542 n.49; Player, supra note 116, at 25-30. MORGAN, BASrc PROBLEMS supra note
19, at .34-36 (Type 2) (Professor Morgan, however, finds few supporting opinions for this type of
"presumption").
s Furnish, supra note 9, at 421.
WEBT=R's THIRD NEW INTERNAONAL DICrONARY 1797 (1971); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425 ("Such
a showing would be evidence that the employer was using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimina-
tion"); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 411 U.S. 804-05 (same); New York City Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S at 587 (same); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S at 447 (same).
" Cf Schnapper, supra note 260, passim; Furnish, supra note 9, at 444; Alberti, supra note
114, at 209-10; Player, supra note 116, at 36 n.53.
"" Maltz, supra note 34, at 351; Smith, supra note 41, at 402-05; Booth & Mackay, supra note
34, at 123; Friedman, supra note 184, at 14. Cf Chamallas, supra note 31, at 320 & n.79; Note,
Judicial Dualism, supra note 9, at 415-16; Note, Plurality's Proposal, supra note 31, at 738 n.11 9 .
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the Court describes the issue at the third stage after the prima facie case
of disparate impact has "dropped from the case" - and the ultimate legal
issue that then remains in Title VII litigation:
If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its
tests are "job related," it remains open to the complaining par-
ty to show that other test or selection devices, without a similar-
ly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's
legitimate interest in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship"
[McDonnell Douglas] at 801, 93 S.Ct. at 1823. Such a showing
would be evidence that the employer was using its test merely
as a "pretext" for discrimination. [McDonnell Douglas] at
804-805, 93 S.Ct. at 1825-1826" 7
Albemarle reflects that this third stage is modeled on - if not precisely
identical to - the third stage in the McDonnell Douglas order of proof. 76
Both McDonnell Douglas and Albemarle require that a showing of
"pretext" be a demonstration that the decision was caused by unlawful
discrimination and that the proffered explanation was merely a pretext
for discrimination.
77
The Court in Beazer reached a similar conclusion, stating that since
there was an express finding that the criterion in question "was not
motivated by racial animus" the plaintiff could not successfully claim
that it "was merely a pretext for intentional discrimination" ' 271 If the
existence of an alternative selection criterion with less disparate impact
had entitled the plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law, irrespective of
the presence or absence of an actual intent to discriminate, then the fac-
tual finding of no racial animus by the trial court would not have pre-
cluded a remand to consider this alternative criterion. In Beazer, however,
the absence of discriminatory intent did obviate further consideration
of less disproportionate alternative criteria.?
171 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 425. The Court in Albermarle did not disclose
any other method to show pretext than the existence of an alternative with less disparate impact.
Furnish, supra note 9, at 423.
7 Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425; Furnish, supra note 9, at 422-23; Note, Judicial Dualism, supra
note 9, at 415-17 ("The incorporation of the concept of pretext into a disparate impact case is com-
pelling evidence that the disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses are being merged.")
217 Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425, 436; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
2 1 New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587. See Furnish, supra note 9, at 424;
Alberti, supra note 114, at 207-10; Caldwell, supra note 247, at 600-02; Chamallas, supra note 31,
at 320 & n.79; Lamber, supra note 109, at 21. But see Chamallas, supra note 31, at 320 & n.77.
z"' See Maltz, supra note 34, at 351-52; Note, Judicial Dualism, supra note 9, at 417-19; Note,
Plurality's Proposal supra note 31, at 738 n.119. Cf Alberti, supra note 114, at 209-10; Middleton,
supra note 34, at 204-05 & n.9 9 .
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Summarizing this line of cases, the majority in Teal, states:
Even in such a case, however, the plaintiff may prevail, if he
shows that the employer was using the practice as a mere pretext
for discrimination?
80
2. Rule 301 and Burdine
Under Rule 301, the prima facie case disappears from the case once
it is rebutted. The prima facie case has no further effect in the litiga-
tion?81 This evidence must be more than "a scintilla," but need not in
fact be believed?82 The case is decided as though there had never been
a presumption or a prima facie case?83 In a jury case, the word "presump-
tion" and its effects would not even be mentioned in jury instructions? 8 4
The issue in litigation following the introduction of rebuttal evidence ig-
nores the prima facie case. After the rebuttal in Title VII litigation, there
are no disparate impact cases and no disparate treatment cases: there
are just Title VII cases. The court focuses solely and exclusively on the
ultimate legal burden of the claim for relief?8 The resolution of this
ultimate legal issue is thus the only issue in the third stage.
And that ultimate legal issue is intentional discrimination. Once the
prima facie case of disparate impact has dropped from the litigation, it
I* Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S at 447. Cf ScHLi & GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 312 (1987
Supp.) Since the Teal trial court had held that a prima facie case - apparently of any kind - had
not been established, neither the second nor the third stage was discussed in detail. Id. at 445.
"I See 1 LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 63, § 69, at 555; McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK, supra note
75, § 345, at 821; MORGAN, BAsxc PROBLEMS, supra note 19, at 34-35; WEiNSTEIN, supra note 49,
300[01], at 300-3; 21 WmGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5122, at 572; Alberti, supra note 114,
at 193 n.67; Ladd, supra note 49, at 282; Laughlin, supra note 200, at 212.
" See House Hearings, supra note 63, at 92 (Statement of Edward W. Cleary). Professor Morgan
describes the minimum proof needed to rebut a Thayer presumption as being "some testimony is
put in which anybody can disbelieve, which comes from interested parties, and which is of a sort
that is usually disbelieved... evidence which may be disbelieved by the trier of fact." 9 WiGMORE,
supra note 62, § 2493f at 328 & n.6, (quoting 18 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 221-22). Professor Cleary described
the "bursting bubble" theory as being that "a presumption disappears from the case upon the in-
troduction of evidence sufficient to support of findings of the nonexistence of the presumed fact,
even though no one believes that evidence." House Hearing.% supra note 63, at 92; 21 WIUGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5122, at 564-65; McCORMCK, supra note 64, at 16-19; Hecht & Pinzler,
supra note 49, at 53 ("ITIhe Thayer test is one of sufficiency and not creditability of the evidence");
id at 549; Laughlin, supra note 200, at 212. But cf Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 49, at 550-51.
'" United States v. Hendrix, 542 F.2d 879, 882 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S 959 (1977);
Alpine Forwarding Ca v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 60 F.2d 734, 736 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.); CoNF. CoMM.
REPORT, supra note 83; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE RULE 704(2), quoted in Gausewitz, supra note 49,
at 333; WEigsTEiN, supra note 49, 300[01], at 300-4. Professor Cleary's Memorandum to the Senate
stated that "the presumption vanishes as a presumption." Id 301[02], at 301-10.
1 MORGAN, BAsic PROBLEMS, supra note 19, at 40-42; WEiNSrEIN, supra note 49, 1 300[01, at
300-4 to 300-5; 301[02], at 301-29; Gausewitz, supra note 49, at 334.
Cf Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 US. at 255-56.
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is the only issue remaining. It is only to the issue of intentional discrimina-
tion that the rebuttal evidence required under either Rule 301 or the
dissenter's view - business necessity, job-relatedness, or legitimate
business purpose - is logically relevant?86
The Court's opinion in Burdine8 7 describes the legal theory inherent
in the Thayer view of presumptions that compels this result: "Third,
should the defendant carry this burden [of rebutting the prima facie case],
the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were
not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination."2ss It is at this
point, according to Burdine, that the plaintiff:
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered
reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading
the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional
discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by per-
suading the court that discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence?8
As is true in civil actions generally,2" and to the chagrin of Justice
Blackmun,191 the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. "[A]
presumption.., does not shift to such party [against whom it is directed]
the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which re-
mains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
cast.'
2 92
Nevertheless under this analysis, after the presumption raised by a
prima facie case of disparate impact is rebutted, the statistics that gave
rise to the prima facie case are still available to show intent.
' See supra at 153-54.
2" 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (disparate treatment).
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
9 d
220 F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.6, at 243 (2d ed. 1977); 1 JONES ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 49, § 5.2 at 524; 1 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 63, § 66 at 526-28; McCoRMICK,
supra note 64, § 337 at 786; W, PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF Tm LAW OF ToRTs, § 41 at 237 (4th ed. 1971);
21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5122, at 555-56; Belton, supra note 11, at 1235.
"' Justice Blackmun disagrees:
Nothing in our cases supports the plurality's declaration that, in the context of a
disparate impact challenge, "the ultimate burden of proving that discrimination against
a protected group has been caused by a specific employment practice remains with the
plaintiff at all times.' Ante, at 2790.
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S Ct. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
2" FED. R. Evm. 301. See also New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S at 587 n.31; 110
Cong. Rec 7214 (Case Clark Interpretive Mem., supra note 6.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
433 B (1965). Cf Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. at 144.
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In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not
imply that the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence
previously introduced by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie
case. A satisfactory explanation by the defendant destroys the
legally mandatory inference of discrimination arising from the
plaintiff's initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence and in-
ferences properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the
trier of fact on the issue of whether or not the defendant's ex-
planation is pretextual. Indeed, there may be some cases where
the plaintiff's initial evidence, combined with effective cross-
examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defend-
ant's explanation 93
This critical point has been purposefully ignored by the dissenters.
Because this analysis governs disparate impact cases as well as disparate
treatment cases, intent can be established inferentially - by circumstan-
tial evidence such as statistics - as well as directly, and the centrality
of the question of discriminatory intent should not inhibit meritorious
claims of actual discrimination, whether proven by disparate impact or
otherwise.
3. Watson and Atonio
While language in both Watson and Atonio incongruously appears
to support both the application of Rule 301 and the dissenters' view to
the third stage, an examination of these passages reflects that the show-
ing of employment selection procedures with less disparate impact
authorized by this language is only an "indirect" and "circumstantial"
means by which to establish intentional discrimination.
In apparent agreement with the dissenters' view, Watson states:
Thus, when a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of
disparate impact, and when the defendant has met its burden
of producing evidence that its employment practices are based
on legitimate business reasons, the plaintiff must "show that
other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable
racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest
2 Id. at 255 n.10. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 82, quoted in U.S CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
7051, 7056 ("The court may instruct the jury that they may infer the existence of the presumed
fact [intentional discrimination] from proof of the basic facts giving rise to the presumption."); Hecht
& Pinzler, supra note 49, at 532, 549; Laughlin, supra note 200, at 214-22.
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 ("This rule ... more specifically...
conforms to the rule in disparate treatment cases that the plaintiff bears the burden of disproving
an employer's assertion that the adverse employment action or practice was based solely on a
legitimate neutral consideration. See [Burdine]/')
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in efficient and trustworthy workmanship." Albemarle Paper
Ca. (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Fac-
tors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative
selection devices are relevant in determining whether they
would be equally as effective as the challenged practice in ser-
ving the employer's legitimate business goals. The same fac-
tors would also be relevant in determining whether the chal-
lenged practice has operated as the functional equivalent of a
pretext for discriminatory treatment. Cf. ibid.9
Similarly, the Court in Atonio states:
If, on remand, respondents meet the proof burdens outlined
above, and establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with
respect to any of petitioners' employment practices, the case will
shift to any business justification petitioners offer for their use
of these practices. This phase of the disparate-impact case con-
tains two components: first, a consideration of the justifications
an employer offers for his use of these practices; and second,
the availability of alternative practices to achieve the same
business ends, with less racial impact. 96
* * *
Finally, if on remand the case reaches this point, and
respondents cannot persuade the trier of fact on the question
of petitioners' business necessity defense, respondents may still
be able to prevail. To do so, respondents will have to persuade
the factfinder that "other tests or selection devices, without a
similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the
employer's legitimate [hiring] interest[s];" by so demonstrating,
respondents would prove that "[petitioners were] using [their]
tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination' 29
" Watson, 108 & Ct. at 2790. Cf Comment, Business Necessity, supra note 236, at 923-25; Mid-
dleton, supra note 34, at 233. Justice Blackmun uses similar language.
And even where an employer proves that a particular selection process is sufficiently
job-related, the process in question may still be determined to be unlawful, if the plaintiff
persuades the court that other selection processes that have a lesser discriminatory
effect could also suitably serve the employer's business needs. Albemarle Paper Ca u
Moody, 422 U.S. at 425.
Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2795 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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These passages are subject to the construction that the challenged employ-
ment practice was not motivated by intentional discrimination, but was
merely its "functional equivalent" not requiring the trial court to make
the more difficult finding even at the third stage.
In other passages, however, both Justice O'Connor and Justice White
appear to endorse the requirement that intentional discrimination be
established at the third stage. Justice O'Connor's description of the
"ultimate legal issue" supports this view: The "ultimate legal issue"
which the plaintiff in disparate impact has the burden to establish is
the same "ultimate legal issue" as in disparate treatment:
The distinguishing features of the factual issues that typically
dominate in disparate impact cases do not imply that the
ultimate legal issue is different than in cases where disparate
treatment analysis is used. See, eg, Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 253-254 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) 98
This language is consistent with every case since Albemarle, as well as
with Rule 301. The Court (again almost unanimously) describes the
"ultimate legal issue" in disparate treatment:
If the defendant carries this burden of production, the plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of all the evidence in the case
that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were a
pretext for discrimination. [Burdine], at 253, 255, n. 10. We have
cautioned that these shifting burdens are meant only to aid
courts and litigants in arranging the presentation of evidence:
"The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff re-
mains at all times with the plaintiff.' [Burdine], at 253. See
also United States Postal Service Bd of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 715 (1983)? 99
To reiterate, this is the same legal issue for both disparate treatment and
disparate impact.
I Watson, 108 S, Ct. at 2785. See id. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 2797 (Stevens,
J., concurring); Roeger, Watson u Fort Worth Bank and Trust" The Supreme Court Robs Peter to Pay
Paul, 17 CAP. U.L. REv. 533, 552 & nn. 108 & 109 (1989); 1987 Term, supra note 113, at 315, 316
& n. 52. But see Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2797 (Stevens, J., concurring).
'" Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2784; id at 2792 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Cf Cox, supra note 12,
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Less abstractly and more directly, both Watson and Atonio define the
alternative showings at the third stage in such a manner that this
evidence necessarily is focused on a circumstantial and indirect establish-
ment of intentional discrimination. Justice O'Connor's description in Wat-
son looks to equal effectiveness - rather than merely "serv[ing] the
[employer's] legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy workman-
ship and which are substantially equally valid" 3® - and to cost and other
burdens.0 1 In Atonio, Justice White's discussion looks not only to costs
but also to actual knowledge by the employer of the less discriminatory
criterion or procedure:
If respondents, having established a prima facie case, come for-
ward with alternatives to petitioners' hiring practices that
reduce the racially-disparate impact of practices currently be-
ing used, and petitioners refuse to adopt these alternatives, such
a refusal would belie a claim by petitioners that their incum-
bent practices are being employed for non-discriminatory
reasons.
Of course, any alternative practices which respondents of-
fer up in this respect must be equally effective as petitioners'
chosen hiring procedures in achieving petitioners' legitimate
employment goals. Moreover, "[flactors such as the cost or other
burdens of proposed alternative selection devices are relevant
in determining whether they would be equally as effective as
the challenged practice in serving the employer's legitimate
business goals."3 02
The imposition of these conditions upon the plaintiff's showing at the
third stage (particularly the actual knowledge of the employer of the
availability and usefulness of the proposed alternatives) so limits the show-
ing that it could only be made for the purpose - and the nearly conclusive
effect - of showing intentional discrimination "indirectly". 03
The practical effect of this analysis is not as significant as its rhetorical
effect. It is decisive perhaps only in deciding defendants' motions
Uniform Guidelines, supra note 15, 1 3B, at 38297. But see Holdeman, Changing Face, supra
note 34, at 198-99.
"I The Uniform Guidelines do not include such factors in the calculation of the alternative criteria.
See id. §§ 3B, 5K, 15B(9), at 38297,38299,38305; Questions 31,48-52, supra note 213, at 12001,12003.
I" Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2127 (quoting Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790).
See Rothschild & Werden, supra note 235, at 271-72.
03Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Cf Lamber, supra note 109, at 21.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:2
66
Akron Law Review, Vol. 23 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss2/1
TITLE VII, RULE 301, AND AONio
for summary judgment." Where the defendant comes forward with a
legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation, but the plaintiff persuades
the court that the explanation is a pretext "for discrimination," then the
court must find for the plaintiff. Where a defendant offers evidence that
it acted for Nondiscriminatory Reason A, but instead the court finds that
the employer was motivated by Nondiscriminatory Reason B, such a find-
ing alone is not sufficient under Albemarl, Teal, or Rule 301 for the plain-
tiff to prevail. The finding that the employer acted for Nondiscriminatory
Reason B when the employer has been saying that he acted for Non-
discriminatory Reason A, however, is evidence from which an inference
can be made that the employer is at least in this respect untruthful and
that neither nondiscriminatory reason in fact motivated the employer?
0 5
The finding does not alone necessarily and conclusively compel a finding
that the employer acted with discriminatory intent. Similarly, the find-
ing that the procedure had no reasonable relationship to Non-
discriminatory Reason A, or that another procedure equally effectuated
Nondiscriminatory Reason A but with less adverse impact on protected
groups, is also evidence (persuasive though not conclusive) of
discriminatory intent?06
Any one of these findings - in conjunction with the evidence offered
to establish the original prima facie case - supports an inference of in-
tentional discrimination." 7 but under consistent Supreme Court
jurisprudence, none of these findings establish a conclusion or even a
presumption of intentional discrimination. At the third stage, all of the
evidence, direct or indirect and circumstantial, must tend to establish
intentional discrimination"
Nevertheless, the rhetorical and moral effect is important. Under the
dissenter's view, any one of several showings becomes the ultimate burden
of the plaintiff?" However, no one has contended that the ultimate pur-
pose of Title VII is to provide an appropriately proportionate workforc 10
or to restrict or regulate non-invidious employment decisions?" But
3" See eg, Taylor v. James River Paper Co., 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 893 (SD. Ala. 1989).
Smith, supra note 41, at 379.
See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 n.5; Furnish, supra
note 9, at 444.
37 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. at 2377-79;
Maltz, supra note 34, at 351; Schnapper, supra note 260, at 39-40 & nn.39, 50-59.
1 See Friedman, supra note 184, at 14-15; Alberti, supra note 114, at 193 n.67; Lamber, supra
note 109, at 21; Smalls, supra note 142, at 265.
o Id. at 256.
810 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (O'Connor, J.). But see FAIRNESS n TESTING, supra note 33, at
35-39; cf Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2130-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
811 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S 193, 197, 204-07 (1979) ("Title VII could not have
been enacted into law without substantial support from legislators in both Houses who traditional-
ly resisted federal regulation of private business. Those legislators demanded as a price for their
support that 'management prerogatives and union freedoms... be left undisturbed to the greatest
extent possible' "). See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1784-85 & n.4 (Brennan, J.)
(discussing legislative history), quoted supra at note 235.
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if one of these showings is the ultimate issue that remains in a Title VII
suit after the prima facie case has dropped from the litigation, then this
functionally is the goal of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This conclusion
is not only without support in the legislative history or the decisions of
the Supreme Court, but also it contradicts the rhetorical and moral basis
advanced during the past fifty years in support of such enactments.
VI. CONCLUSION
The thesis of this paper, as noted at its beginning, is that the Supreme
Court's decisions in Watson and Atonio are the logical and consistent
development from the three stage order of proof first announced in
Albemarle in 1975. This thesis better explains the development of Title
VII law since Griggs, better effectuates the purposes of Title VII disclosed
both in its legislative history and in the Court's decisions previous to
Watson, and better provides a guide to its future development, than any
alternative analytical method. Clearly not all of the principles of law
which this analysis would require have yet to be accepted, but the foun-
dation is now securely in place.31
This thesis does not require that the trial of Title VII cases proceed
in four separate and alternating presentations of evidence? 13 Nor is it
refuted because this procedure does not and often as a practical matter
cannot take place? 14 It describes the analysis by which all evidence,
whenever and by whomever offered, is properly weighed.
The logical and ethical motivation for the Watson four and the Atonio
five, as it almost certainly was for the Albemarle majority,31 5 in thus com-
prehensively repudiating the widespread misinterpretation of Griggs, was
succinctly stated by Justice O'Connor:
In sum, the high standards of proof [for plaintiffs] in disparate
impact cases are sufficient in our view to avoid giving employers
incentives to modify any normal and legitimate practices by
introducing quotas or preferential treatment.316
This passage reflects the resolute determination of the Court at least since
1975, if not before, that Title VII was enacted to end the curse of racial
discrimination and that it shall not become an instrument of racial
preference.
s1= Cf Furnish, supra note 9, at 440-45.
8 See THAYER, supra note 19, at 364-65; LANGDELL, supra note 158, at §§ 4-14. Cf Hopkins,
109 S. Ct. at 1812 (bifurcated trials).
".. See Hopkins, 109 S Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Player, supra note 116, at 21 n.13.
"' See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, at 16-25, Alber-
marie Paper Co. v. Moody. See also Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I fear
that a too-rigid application of the EEOC Guidelines will leave the employer with little choice, save
an impossibly expensive and complex validation study, but to engage in a subjective quota system
of employment selection. This, of course, is far from the intent of Title VII')
"e Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S Ct. at 2791; Cox, supra note 12, at 761-62, 770-71.
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